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A PROMISE THE NATION CANNOT KEEP:  WHAT PREVENTS
THE APPLICATION OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT IN
PRISON?
Raja Raghunath*
ABSTRACT
The walls of the prison are not solely physical.  The doctrine of judicial deference
to prison officials, which compels courts to defer to the discretion of those officials
in almost all instances, obstructs the effective scrutiny of modern practices of punish-
ment.  Since its ratification, the Thirteenth Amendment—which prohibits slavery or
involuntary servitude anywhere within the United States or its jurisdiction, except
where imposed “as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted”1—has been seen by courts as one brick in this wall.  This Article makes the
novel argument that, properly read, the amendment should function instead as a breach
in this wall—one of sufficient size to allow some needed light to shine within.
Although in some states inmates may still be sentenced to hard labor, in most sys-
tems today, they labor under a more general requirement that, if they are able-bodied,
they must work.  Reading the word “punishment” in the Thirteenth Amendment in a
manner consistent with the way that same word is used in the Eighth Amendment, and
is understood in the rest of the Constitution, reveals that only those inmates who are
forced to work because they have been so sentenced—which is not the vast majority
of inmates compelled to work in the present day—should be exempted from the gen-
eral ban on involuntary servitude.  In addition to examining the jurisprudence of the
Eighth and Fifth Amendments as it relates to this question, this Article also details the
history of forced labor programs as punishment, and how courts’ reading of the punish-
ment exception is not supported by either the circumstances surrounding ratification
of the Thirteenth Amendment or the ways that courts have construed it as a whole since
that time.
This Article argues that the reason courts have broadened the meaning of “punish-
ment” in the Thirteenth Amendment, while simultaneously narrowing it in the Eighth
Amendment, is because these directly contradictory acts of constitutional interpretation
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1 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
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both serve the same end of judicial deference to the actions of prison officials, which
has resulted in the general abdication by courts of their constitutional obligations to
oversee those officials’ actions.  This Article also theorizes about the potential out-
comes of interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment properly with respect to prison labor,
and suggests that the resulting recognition of the punitive purposes that have always
driven our prison labor programs may actually lead to an improvement in the overall
well-being of prisoners, and perhaps of society as a whole.
So this is the Chain Gang.  Among ourselves it is most often re-
ferred to as The Hard Road, as a noun and as a proper name, capi-
talized and sacred.  In the evening you can see us driving down the
highway in a long caravan of black and yellow trucks heading back
to Camp.  And as we go by we get down on our knees in order to
get a better view, our wicked, dirty faces peering through the bars
to eyeball at your Free World.2
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2 DONN PEARCE, COOL HAND LUKE 6–7 (1965).
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INTRODUCTION
The walls of the prison are not solely physical.  “[C]ontempt, the highest of
walls,”3 reinforces and heightens the barrier between inmates and free society.  In the
realm of individual rights, the doctrine of judicial deference to prison officials, which
compels courts to defer to the discretion of those officials in almost all instances,4 is
a high barrier to the effective scrutiny of modern practices of punishment.  Since the
time of its ratification in the Reconstruction Era, the Thirteenth Amendment has been
improperly employed as one brick in this wall.  Properly read, however, the amend-
ment instead functions as a breach in this barrier: not one large enough to permit
escape, but a breach of sufficient size to allow some needed light to shine within.
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery or involuntary servitude anywhere
within the United States or its jurisdiction, except where imposed “as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.”5  In the years since rati-
fication of the amendment, federal courts have construed this exception to allow for
nearly all forms of forced labor by convicts,6 except where particular instances of such
labor have run afoul of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punish-
ments.”7  In some states, individuals may still be sentenced to hard labor,8 but in
most systems today, inmates labor under a more general requirement that, if they are
able-bodied, they must work.9
3 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 287 (Alan
Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1977) (1975) (quoting Michèle Perrot).
4 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (“[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on
inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.”); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 121 (1977)
(holding, inter alia, that reasonable views of correctional officials of possible detriment to
the institution from prisoner labor organizing outweighed those inmates’ First Amendment
associational rights).
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. The amendment reads in full: “SECTION 1. Neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
SECTION 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” Id.
6 See Ali v. Johnson, 259 F.3d 317, 317 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[I]nmates sentenced to incarcer-
ation cannot state a viable Thirteenth Amendment claim if the prison system requires them
to work.”).
7 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 2006)
(holding that where plaintiff-inmate and “other prison print shop employees noticed that his
press was dangerously defective,” and the machine had previously “bucked and almost tore
off two of his fingers while he was operating it,” plaintiff who “was subsequently injured when
the press caught his hand and tore off his right thumb” was entitled to proceeds for damages
against the prison official overseeing the shop for a “violation of the Eighth Amendment”).
8 See, e.g., VT. CONST. ch. II, § 64 (“[M]eans ought to be provided for punishing by hard
labor, those who shall be convicted of crimes not capital, whereby the criminal shall be
employed for the benefit of the public, or for the reparation of injuries done to private
persons: and all persons at proper times ought to be permitted to see them at their labor.”).
9 See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 497.099 (Vernon 2007) (“The department shall
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Reading the Thirteenth Amendment in a manner that is consistent with the
weight of constitutional jurisprudence under the Eighth Amendment10 and the Fifth
Amendment11 reveals that only those inmates who are forced to work because they
have been so sentenced should be exempted from the general ban on involuntary
servitude.  That is not, however, how the courts have ever interpreted the Thirteenth
Amendment.  Instead, the logic of the prison deference doctrine has driven the judicial
broadening of the meaning of punishment where such deference is served,12 and the
narrowing of the meaning of that word in situations where doing so serves the same
end.13  This self-serving act of constitutional interpretation deprives the Thirteenth
Amendment of meaning and effect.  “If Congress cannot say that being a free man
means at least this much” to those held behind prison walls, as the Supreme Court has
noted in another context, “then the Thirteenth Amendment made a promise the Nation
cannot keep.”14
Part I of this Article describes the doctrine of judicial deference to prison officials
and its centrality to both our modern system of punishment and the effectuation of
prisoners’ rights.  This part also offers some predictions as to what might come out of
a re-examination, in the manner sought in this Article, of the Thirteenth Amendment’s
protections for prisoners.  Part II relates the history of forced labor programs as
punishment in Western society, and specifically describes how the protections of the
Thirteenth Amendment have been held not to apply to such programs.  Part III of this
Article describes how neither the historical circumstances surrounding ratification of
the amendment, nor the relevant ways that courts’ understandings of the amendment
have evolved since that time, support the manner in which it is currently applied by
courts to prisoners.  Part IV describes the parallel jurisprudence of the Eighth and
require each inmate . . . housed in a facility operated by or under contract with the department
to work . . . to the extent that the inmate . . . is physically and mentally capable of working.”).
10 See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991) (drawing a distinction between harms
characterized as prison conditions and those “formally meted out as punishment by the
statute or the sentencing judge,” with the former category only actionable where “some
mental element . . . attributed to the inflicting officer” is present).
11 See United States v. Ramirez, 556 F.2d 909, 920–21 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 926 (1977) (holding, inter alia, that the “punitive element [of incarceration] connected
with the crime, and the only element still controlled by the sentencing judge, is the loss of
freedom for some period of time,” such that prison officials could not “punish individual
prisoners for their crimes” without violating the indictment clause of the Fifth Amendment).
12 See, e.g., Smith v. Dretke, 157 F. App’x 747, 748 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The Thirteenth
Amendment permits involuntary servitude without pay as punishment after conviction of an
offense, even when the prisoner is not explicitly sentenced to hard labor. Consequently, Smith
has not shown that the defendants violated his rights by making him hold a prison job.”) (internal
citations omitted).
13 See, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 42 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The
text and history of the Eighth Amendment . . . raise substantial doubts in my mind that the
Eighth Amendment proscribes a prison deprivation that is not inflicted as part of a sentence.”).
14 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968).
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Fifth Amendments, which have taken the opposite approach to the meaning of the
word “punishment” to reach the same end of defeating most prisoner claims for
violations of their rights under those amendments.
Part V of this Article explores the philosophical differences between what we
understand the phrase “hard labor” to mean, and the properly understood meaning of
“punishment” in the Thirteenth Amendment, and asks whether those differences can
meaningfully guide the application of the arguments made herein.  This part also theo-
rizes about the potential outcomes of such application; in particular, the value of fully
understanding the punitive reasons why we compel prisoners to work as a potential
constraint on the types of labor to which we compel them.  The Article concludes that
there exists the possibility that prisoners in particular, and society as a whole, will be
better off as a result of adopting this new understanding of the Thirteenth Amendment.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO PRISON OFFICIALS AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS
A. The Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, in Service of Punishment
In earlier times, the protections of the Constitution were denied to prisoners com-
pelled to work because the beneficial value of the prisoners’ labor was owned by the
prison;15 i.e., they were enslaved by the state.16  Although such views do not neces-
sarily inform today’s courts,17 the modern doctrine of prison deference presents a
15 See Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the
Economic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L. REV. 857, 890 (2008) (“The
second way that exchange might be lacking is if inmate work, while productive, is in the
prison’s possession from the start, rather than being transferred in an exchange between the
parties. An argument along these lines appears to underlie courts’ frequent assertion that in-
mates cannot be employees because ‘the economic reality is that their labor belong[s] to the
institution.’”) (internal citations omitted).
16 See E. Stagg Whitin, The Caged Man: A Summary of Existing Legislation in the United
States on the Treatment of Prisoners, 3 PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. 24 (1913) (“The prisoner is
the property of the state or a subdivision of the state while he is in penal servitude.”); see also
Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 795–96 (1871) (“A convicted felon, whom
the law in its humanity punishes by confinement in the penitentiary instead of with death, is
subject while undergoing that punishment, to all the laws which the Legislature in its wisdom
may enact for the government of that institution and the control of its inmates. For the time
being, during his term of service in the penitentiary, he is in a state of penal servitude to the
State. He has, as a consequence of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal
rights except those which the law in its humanity accords to him. He is for the time being the
slave of the State.”).
17 See, e.g., Washlefske v. Winston, 60 F. Supp. 2d 534, 539 (E.D. Va. 1999), aff’d, 234
F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2000); cert. denied, 532 U.S. 983 (2001) (“[T]he idea expressed by the
court in Ruffin, that inmates are no more than ‘slaves of the State,’ has been repeatedly and
expressly repudiated by other courts.”).
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comparably formidable obstacle to the adoption of an interpretation of the Thirteenth
Amendment’s “punishment for crime” exception that limits it to those inmates who
are compelled to work as punishment; that is, to the extent they are so sentenced by
a judge or jury.18
The strength of the prison deference doctrine is shown by the courts’ uniform
resistance to attempts by prisoners to invoke other workers’ rights, such as the statu-
tory minimum wage (or any wage at all),19 the protections of the Eighth Amendment’s
ban on “cruel and unusual punishments” to enforce limits on hours worked,20 or to
hold prison officials liable for constitutional torts when inmates are injured on the
job.21  Although the stated rationale that courts have used has changed over time and
in these different contexts, the underlying principle of the judiciary’s deference has
not,22 as it is rooted in the essence of our modern system of punishment.
The courts defer to prison administrators because the prison, by definition, operates
in an entirely different sphere than the free world that the rest of us inhabit.  As the
philosopher Michel Foucault described in his landmark work Discipline and Punish,
the modern prison has supplanted the public square as the site of collective punish-
ment, but the locus of that punishment has not changed—it remains the body of the
criminal.23  In lieu of inflicting physical pain as retribution for wrongs, we segregate
18 Cf. Helling, 509 U.S. at 38 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“At the time the Eighth Amendment
was ratified, the word ‘punishment’ referred to the penalty imposed for the commission of
a crime.”) (internal citations omitted).
19 See generally Zatz, supra note 15, at 867–81 (discussing contemporary prison labor and
consistent exclusion of prisoners from Fair Labor Standards Act coverage, based on a variety
of justifications).
20 See Woodall v. Partilla, 581 F. Supp. 1066, 1077 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (“In the instant case,
Woodall does not allege that defendants compelled him to perform labor beyond his physical
capabilities or which endangered his health. Nor does he allege that he suffered abusive treat-
ment. Woodall merely asserts that he worked an average of 16–18 hours per day. The complaint
is wholly devoid of specific allegations of extreme hardship in his working conditions and thus
fails to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment.”).
21 See generally Colleen Dougherty, Comment, The Cruel and Unusual Irony of Prisoner
Work Related Injuries in the United States, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 483, 484 (2008)
(arguing that “prisoners in many states can be severely injured while forced to work with
defective or unsafe prison machinery but have difficulty seeking a remedy because they cannot
meet the onerous deliberate indifference standard required to establish an Eighth Amendment
violation”); Amy L. Riederer, Note, Working 9 to 5: Embracing the Eighth Amendment
Through an Integrated Model of Prison Labor, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1425, 1444–47 (2009)
(describing various prison labor and non-labor conditions held not sufficient by courts to
constitute actionable violations of Eighth Amendment).
22 See, e.g., Ex Parte Taws, 23 F. Cas. 725, 725 (C.C.D. Pa. 1809) (No. 13,768) (“We do
not think it right to interfere with the jailer in the exercise of the discretion vested in him, as to
the security of his prisoners; unless it appeared that he misused it for purposes of oppression,
of which there is no evidence in this case.”).
23 FOUCAULT, supra note 3, at 11 (“But the punishment-body relation is not the same
as it was in the torture during public executions. The body now serves as an instrument or
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the criminal from public view and access to particular rights of the free.24  Foucault
called this “an economy of suspended rights.”25  Included among these suspended
rights are most of the rights of free workers, in part because the notion of providing
them to convicted criminals offends popular sensibilities.
David Garland has traced how, in the last forty years, after the rehabilitation of
prisoners “was suddenly dislodged from its central, axiomatic position” in criminal
justice policy in the early 1970s “and made to occupy a quite different and diminished
role in subsequent policy and practice,”26 we have come to measure our collective
well-being by the degree to which criminals are deprived of their rights as punishment,
what is called the “retributive” model of punishment.27  Garland saw this trend as
having come so far today that “[t]he interests of victim and offender are assumed to
be diametrically opposed: the rights of one competing with those of the other in the
form of a zero sum game.”28  Paul Campos has referred to the inequalities and partic-
ular retributive mismatches that necessarily result from seeking such a “reciprocity
of suffering”29 as the “paradox of punishment [that] has become hidden, like the
criminal himself, from our view.”30
intermediary: if one intervenes upon it to imprison it, or to make it work, it is in order to de-
prive the individual of a liberty that is regarded both as a right and as property. . . . Physical
pain, the pain of the body itself, is no longer the constituent element of the penalty.”).
24 See, e.g., M. Kay Harris & Frank M. Dunbaugh, Premise for a Sensible Sentencing
Debate: Giving Up Imprisonment, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 417, 419 (1979) (quoting Dr. Karl
Menninger as noting that “[o]ur forefathers’ inventions were replaced by the slow tortures
of imprisonment—away from the public view”) (internal citation omitted).
25 FOUCAULT, supra note 3, at 11 (“From being an art of unbearable sensations punish-
ment has become an economy of suspended rights.”). Conservative critics of Foucault find
his perspective replete with “romantic myths about incarceration,” and argue that principles that
“remain abhorrent to a Foucauldian perspective on corrections” nevertheless are “essential
to sound management.” See, e.g., Heather Mac Donald, The Jail Inferno, CITY J., Summer
2009, at 12–23.
26 DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 54 (2001). See generally id. at ch. 3 (describing how “[a] movement
that initially aimed to enhance prisoners’ rights, minimize imprisonment, restrict state power,
and end predictive restraint, ultimately ushered in policies that did quite the opposite”).
27 See Kyron Huigens, On Commonplace Punishment Theory, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 437,
441 (“The deontological theory of punishment justifies punishment by appeal to retribution:
to take retribution on a wrongdoer is an unconditional duty.”).
28 GARLAND, supra note 26, at 180; see also John Pfaff, Reform School: Five Myths About
Prison Growth Dispelled, SLATE, Feb. 19, 2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2211585 (“[I]f we
look back historically at the lockup rate for mental hospitals as well as prisons, we have only
just now returned to the combined rates for both kinds of incarceration in the 1950s. In other
words, we’re not locking up a greater percentage of the population so much as locking people
up in prisons rather than mental hospitals. Viewed through this lens, what seems remarkable
is not the current era of mass incarceration but the 1960s and ‘70s, during which we emptied
the hospitals without filling the prisons.”).
29 Paul Campos, The Paradox of Punishment, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1931, 1936.
30 Id. at 1940.
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The interplay between these various forces in our system of punishment has led
to what one court described as a “tension” in the modern doctrine of prison deference
between the view that a prisoner enjoys many constitutional rights,
which rights can be limited only to the extent necessary for the
maintenance of a person’s status as prisoner (or parolee), and the
view that a prisoner has only a few rudimentary rights and must
accept whatever regulations and restrictions prison administrators
and State law deem essential to a correctional system.31
In 1974, a year after the above statement was made by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court emphatically proclaimed that
there was no “iron curtain” between prisoners and their constitutional rights.32  At least
one observer optimistically predicted that, as judges had “begun to delve into the ratio-
nale behind prison regulations,” in the future “a recital of ‘security’ or ‘rehabilitation’
as the purpose of such regulations will not automatically justify them.”33  However,
after a few years of rising crime rates34 and a number of Supreme Court decisions
rejecting such a fulsome approach to prison litigation,35 by the end of the 1970s
others were seeing a “clearly marked trend towards a presumptive validity for prison
regulations,”36 a trend that continues today.37
31 Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F.2d 1335, 1338 (7th Cir. 1973); see also Ira P. Robbins, The
Cry of Wolfish in the Federal Courts: The Future of Federal Judicial Intervention in Prison
Administration, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 213 (1980) (attributing the doctrine of
judicial deference to, inter alia, “the traditional distinction drawn by courts between rights
and privileges,” such that “courts often labelled all features of prison existence as privileges,
and consequently denied review”).
32 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974) (“But though his rights may be
diminished by the needs and exigencies of the institutional environment, a prisoner is not
wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime. There is no
iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country.”).
33 Sarah M. Singleton, Note, Unionizing America’s Prisons—Arbitration and State-Use,
48 IND. L.J. 493, 495 n.12 (1973).
34 See GARLAND, supra note 26, at 106 (“From the mid-1960s onwards, rates of property
and violent crime that were double and treble those of pre-war rates increasingly became an
acknowledged and commonplace feature of social experience. By the early 1990s, despite some
levelling off, the recorded rates were as much as ten times those of forty years before.”).
35 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (“[T]he problems that arise in the day-to-
day operation of a corrections facility are not susceptible of easy solutions. Prison adminis-
trators therefore should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution
of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and dis-
cipline and to maintain institutional security.”); see also Jones v. N.C.  Prisoners’ Labor Union,
Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
36 Robbins, supra note 31, at 218.
37 See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 228 (2005) (“It follows that courts must
give substantial deference to prison management decisions before mandating additional
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Today’s courts rely heavily upon the doctrine of prison deference to defeat
prisoner claims, irrespective of whether the inmate rights at issue have actually been
violated.38  In an earlier era, this was referred to by one observer as a “‘hands-off’
doctrine,” which, until approximately the late 1960s and early 1970s, compelled “a
majority of state and federal courts [to] follow[] a policy of declining jurisdiction over
most litigation involving prisons.”39  The modern federal courts often locate the source
of their deference in the separation of powers envisioned in the Constitution, noting
that the branches of government that are tasked by that document with implementing
our system of punishment are the legislature and the executive.40  As Foucault has
pointed out, the roots of this deference actually extend farther back in history than the
American Revolution, to the first institutions of penitentiary confinement.41  Even the
first Western jailers, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, demanded a degree of
autonomy from the judicial apparatus that created the need for their very profession.42
As a result of this history, where courts have wished to preserve the impregnability
of the prison’s walls from the intrusion of prisoners’ rights under Constitutional amend-
ments other than the Thirteenth, they have engaged in a far more exacting analysis than
they have in the Thirteenth Amendment context, and examined whether the purposes
behind the treatment of prisoner-litigants supported categorizing that treatment as
“punishment.”43  The question presented by this Article is whether that more exacting
expenditures . . . .”); Jones, 433 U.S. at 125 (“The District Court, we believe, got off on
the wrong foot in this case by not giving appropriate deference to the decisions of prison
administrators and appropriate recognition to the peculiar and restrictive circumstances of
penal confinement.”).
38 See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (holding facially valid a restriction on
inmate-to-inmate correspondence, but striking a regulation prohibiting inmates from marrying,
as the former was reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective, in that case security,
but the latter was not).
39 Robbins, supra note 31, at 211 & n.10.
40 See id. at 212 (describing the “basic argument” of separation of powers basis for judicial
deference as the fact that “control over prison management lies exclusively with the legislative
branch of government,” and “federal and state statutes delegate exclusive responsibility for
administration of prisons to the executive branch of government, including wide discretion
over routine prison matters”); see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 548 (“[T]he operation of our correc-
tional facilities is peculiarly the province of the Legislative and Executive Branches of our
Government, not the Judicial.”) (citations omitted).
41 See FOUCAULT, supra note 3, at 121 (“[The] functioning [of the oldest penitentiary, the
Rasphuis of Amsterdam, opened in 1596,] obeyed three great principles: the duration of the
penalties could, at least within certain limits, be determined by the administration itself, accord-
ing to the prisoner’s conduct . . . . Work was obligatory; it was performed in common . . . and,
for the work done, the prisoners received wages.”).
42 See id. at 129 (“The agent of punishment must exercise a total power, which no third
party can disturb; the individual to be corrected must be entirely enveloped in the power that
is being exercised over him. Secrecy is imperative, and so too is autonomy, at least in rela-
tion to this technique of punishment: it must have its own functioning, its own rules, its own
techniques, its own knowledge; it must fix its own norms, decide its own results.”).
43 See infra Part IV.
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analysis, if brought to bear on prisoners’ Thirteenth Amendment claims, would yield
any benefits for them or only result in greater hardship.
B. The Hard Road, and What Condemnation to it May Illuminate
The chain gang prisoners in the novel Cool Hand Luke referred to their grueling
conditions of forced road labor as “The Hard Road.”44  Compliance with the punitive
demands of a properly understood Thirteenth Amendment, as argued for in this Article,
could mean that much prison labor would return to something akin to this Hard Road. 
The decisions that would have to be made for the implementation of such a return
would therefore provide the opportunity to revisit the discussion of who among us
is—and is not—properly sent down that road.  The prospect of The Hard Road would
also introduce, in all concerned, the (hopefully) self-limiting awareness that we are
subjecting individuals to unpleasant conditions not for their own purported benefit,
but as a penalty for their commission of a crime, so it is incumbent on us to get it right
and not overdo it.45
For jurisdictions wishing to retain a general inmate work requirement, the most
direct response to a Supreme Court opinion returning us to The Hard Road would
likely be to lobby for the enactment of a sentencing statute that explicitly includes hard
labor or, where such statutes already exist,46 for their broader application.  The leg-
islative, administrative, and expert bodies that exist (or that are created)47 for such an
undertaking would then be given the opportunity to examine the state of prison work
requirements, and the nature of modern punishment generally, in their relevant sys-
tems, thereby opening to public inquiry the largely unseen lives of the more than 2.3
million people incarcerated in the United States, the highest per-capita rate of im-
prisonment in the world.48
44 See PEARCE, supra note 2, at 6.
45 See, e.g., Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 475, 484 (1968)
(“Because treatment is regarded as a benefit, though it may involve pain, it is natural that less
restraint is exercised in bestowing it, than in inflicting punishment.”); Robert A. Pugsley,
Retributivism: A Just Basis for Criminal Sentences, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 379, 403–404 (1979)
(arguing that retributivism is “the most appropriate theory upon which to construct a just system
of definite sentences,” as it “is honest about punishment-as-pain, and therefore, it seeks to limit
punishment,” and provides “truth-in-labeling,” insofar as it acknowledges “that punishment
is an unpleasant thing to impose on another human being and fellow citizen”) (internal citations
omitted).
46 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30(C)(2) (2008) (declaring that for the crime of first
degree murder, “the offender shall be punished by death or life imprisonment at hard labor”);
see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 721 (7th ed. 1999) (noting, in the definition of “hard
labor,” that “[s]everal states (such as Louisiana, Maine, and New Jersey) impose hard labor
as a sentence for a variety of crimes”).
47 See, e.g., Ryan Grim, Webb Crime Bill Moving in House, HUFFINGTON POST, June 24,
2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/06/24/webb-crime-bill-moving-in_n_220381.html
(“The Senate bill was introduced by Sen. Jim Webb and would create a commission to make
recommendations on the reform of everything from sentencing to drug policy.”).
48 Pierre Thomas & Jason Ryan, U.S. Prison Population Hits All-Time High: 2.3 Million
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The flowering of a thousand such examinations across the country could be seen
as a cause for guarded optimism.  The doctrine of prison deference does have limits,
after all, and, in their more extreme forms, those limits are easily identifiable as such. 
For example, it has been argued that a plain reading of the Thirteenth Amendment
would allow for the imposition of either involuntary servitude or slavery as punish-
ment for crime.49  However, we no longer view the infliction of pain—or rather, too
much pain50—as an acceptable form of punishment,51 so presumably sentencing con-
victed criminals to slave-like conditions (or granting prison wardens the discretion to
treat them as such)52 is not an acceptable policy option.  Justice Antonin Scalia has
admitted, for example, that he doubts whether any originalist judge would permit whip-
ping or branding against an Eighth Amendment challenge, “[e]ven if it could be demon-
strated unequivocally that these were not cruel and unusual measures in 1791 . . . .”53 
Clearly there are situations where our modern definition of punishment will necessarily,
and correctly,54 trump what we take to be our understanding of the original meaning
of the term.55
Incarcerated: DOJ Report Reveals Record Numbers in Prisons Last Year, With Huge Economic
Impacts, ABC NEWS, June 6, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=5009270.
49 See generally Scott W. Howe, Slavery as Punishment: Original Public Meaning, Cruel
and Unusual Punishment and the Neglected Clause in the Thirteenth Amendment, 51 ARIZ.
L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1347156.
50 See Ray v. Mabry, 556 F.2d 881, 882 (8th Cir. 1977) (“Compelling prison inmates to
work does not contravene the Thirteenth Amendment . . . . However there are circumstances
in which prison work requirements can constitute cruel and unusual punishment . . . [such
as where] ‘prison officials knowingly . . . compel convicts to perform physical labor which is
beyond their strength, or which constitutes a danger to their lives or health, or which is unduly
painful . . . .’”) (internal citations omitted).
51 See, e.g., Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006) (“For our pur-
poses, we conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Morgan, shows
that Canady violated Morgan’s constitutional right not to be compelled to perform work that
endangered his health and caused undue pain.”).
52 But see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-251(A) (2008) (“The director has the authority to
require that each able-bodied prisoner under commitment to the state department of corrections
engage in hard labor for not less than forty hours per week.”); Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d
1549, 1551–53 (5th Cir. 1990) (denying Thirteenth Amendment challenge by prisoners who
“had [not] been sentenced to hard labor” by their being “assigned to work for the Sheriff’s
daughter and son-in-law”).
53 Antonin Scalia, Essay, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861 (1989).
54 See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 691 (1987)
(“It is apparently the hope of some originalists that history can serve as a way out of the realm
of personal choice. They think that if we accord authority to the opinions of the founders, we
can preclude judges, and ourselves, from importing into constitutional interpretation our own
values, preferences, individual viewpoints, and subjective and societal blindness and prej-
udice . . . . [E]ven if this flight from choice were appropriate, it is impossible if history is the
chosen escape route.”).
55 See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002) (finding Alabama’s use of “hitch-
ing post” to discipline chain gang inmates an “obvious” violation of “the ‘basic concept
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But when would “hard labor” be too “hard” in this sense?  The recent reintroduc-
tion of chain gangs in Alabama, and the hurried retraction of this policy in the face of
litigation,56 despite strong public support for the practice,57 illustrates that some of
the traditional forms of inmate labor no longer fall within the acceptable legal bound-
aries of modern punishment.58  How will the relevant decision-makers determine that
the labor which particular criminals will be compelled to do is “hard” enough to meet
its punitive purpose,59 yet remain compliant with the other constitutional protections
afforded prisoners?  Each jurisdiction will have to define, according to its values, the
types of forced labor that will be considered punitive in this respect, but this exercise
does not have purely abstract implications.  For example, it has been observed that,
where inmates are subjected in apparently arbitrary fashion to additional hardship as
punishment for their crimes, such impositions detract from, rather than add to, the
prospects for reducing those inmates’ recidivism.60  Such additional hardship also de-
tracts from the calculus of proportionality that is inherent in setting out appropriate
punishments for crime.61
underlying the Eighth Amendment[, which] is nothing less than the dignity of man’”) (internal
citations omitted).
56 See generally Tessa M. Gorman, Back on the Chain Gang: Why the Eighth Amendment
and the History of Slavery Proscribe the Resurgence of Chain Gangs, 85 CAL. L. REV. 441,
453, 456–57 (1997) (describing the newly-elected Governor of Alabama’s reinstitution of chain
gangs on May 3, 1995, and the state’s subsequent cessation of the “practice of chaining inmates
together” on “June 19, 1996, without being ordered to do so by the Court . . . in a settlement
with the Southern Poverty Law Center . . . .”).
57 See id. at 453 & n.92 (“Polling showed that an overwhelming majority of Alabamians
approved of the idea.”).
58 But see id. at 458 (“Chain gangs still exist and continue to prosper in Alabama. The
Alabama Department of Corrections still has high-risk prisoners working on the roads, and
they still are bound in chains. Each prisoner on the chain gang has his legs shackled together,
but is not chained to other inmates.”) (internal citations omitted).
59 See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT 158–59 (James T. McHugh
ed., Prometheus Books 2009) (1830) (“If labour then, even though forced, will in time lose
much of its hardship, how much easier will it become when the duration and the mode are in
some measure regulated by the will of the labourer himself; when the bitter ideas of infamy
and compulsion are removed, and the idea of gain is brought in to sweeten the employment?”);
see also FOUCAULT, supra note 3, at 240 (“The labour of prisoners was remunerated in France.
This posed a problem: if work in prison is remunerated, that work cannot really form part of
the penalty.”).
60 See, e.g., FOUCAULT, supra note 3, at 266 (“The arbitrary power of administration:
‘The feeling of injustice that a prisoner has is one of the causes that may make his character
untamable. When he sees himself exposed in this way to suffering, which the law has neither
ordered nor envisaged, he becomes habitually angry against everything around him; he sees
every agent of authority as an executioner; he no longer thinks that he was guilty: he accuses
justice itself.’”) (internal citation omitted).
61 See, e.g., Morris, supra note 45, at 480 (“[T]he deprivation, in this just system of punish-
ment, is linked to rules that fairly distribute benefits and burdens and to procedures that strike
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Requiring policymakers and the public at large to confront the implications of
compliance with a properly-understood Thirteenth Amendment therefore has the
potential to initiate an illuminating debate about our modern system of incarceration,
a system larded with injustices, but one for which we have yet to discern any effective
alternative.62  Even if such a discussion never occurs in our wider society, the judi-
ciary’s response to a Supreme Court decision returning us to The Hard Road would, at
a minimum, conclusively answer the question of whether “the freedom that Congress
is empowered to secure under the Thirteenth Amendment”63 includes in any of its
aspects the rights of prisoners to be free from forced labor.64
A return to The Hard Road would not mean the end of all “non-hard” prison labor
programs.  It would simply mean that inmate participation in such programs could no
longer be compelled, a result that should serve, rather than detract from, those pro-
grams’ non-punitive purposes.65  The other tangible outcome in the law that may re-
sult from this return is the creation of what one observer has called, in another context,
the “blameless liberty” of the criminally accused.66  With respect to prison labor pro-
grams, such a blameless liberty would take the form of a (non-legally enforceable)
right of prisoners to refuse to work except where they have been sentenced to do so.67 
The right would be “non-legally enforceable” in the sense that the doctrines of prison
deference and qualified immunity would still allow for a broad latitude of behavior
on the part of officials, as they do in the due process context,68 thus permitting those
some balance between not punishing the guilty and punishing the innocent.”).
62 See, e.g., FOUCAULT, supra note 3, at 232 (“We are aware of all the inconveniences of
prison, and that it is dangerous when it is not useless. And yet one cannot ‘see’ how to replace
it. It is the detestable solution, which one seems unable to do without.”).
63 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968).
64 Cf. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944) (“A prisoner retains all the
rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from
him by law.”); Bruce Western & Christopher Wildeman, Punishment, Inequality, and the
Future of Mass Incarceration, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 851, 851 (2009) (“Since the zenith of the
Civil Rights Movement in the late 1960s, the character and extent of American citizenship
have been redrawn by the steady growth in the penal population. The emergence of mass
imprisonment—historically high and concentrated rates of incarceration—represents a new
type of institutionalized inequality.”).
65 See Edward M. Kennedy, Symposium on Sentencing, Part I: Introduction, 7 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1978) (“Abolition of prison rehabilitation programs is not the answer. Indeed,
such programs should be expanded, especially in the areas of vocational and educational train-
ing. What is needed is the abolition of compulsory rehabilitation, particularly as a justification
for imprisonment.”) (internal citations omitted).
66 Alice Ristroph, Essay, Respect and Resistance in Punishment Theory, 97 CAL. L. REV.
601, 628 (2009).
67 See id. at 602–03.
68 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952 (2009) (upholding qualified immu-
nity of high officials involved in long-term detention of Arab-Muslim immigration violators
after September 11, 2001 because the complaint did not “contain facts plausibly showing that
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officials to seek out alternative ways to coerce or convince individual prisoners to
obey work requirements.69
The pendulum could, however, swing in the other direction, leading to a prolif-
eration of nondiscretionary hard-labor sentencing statutes that embrace the extremes
of retributive justice’s demand for punishment as “an unconditional duty.”70  The argu-
ment has been made that the “imposition of a draconian penalty can upset the proper
balance between society, the victim, and the offender just as surely as the crime itself
has done.”71  It is more difficult to argue today for such a conservation of harm between
the incarcerated and non-incarcerated worlds, since,
[l]ike the pre-modern sanctions of transportation or banishment,
the prison now functions as a form of exile, its use shaped less
by a rehabilitative ideal and more by what Rutherford calls an
“eliminative” one . . . . [T]he offender is rendered more and more
abstract, more and more stereotypical, more and more a projected
image rather than an individuated person.72
In lieu of genuine human understanding, then, some clarity on the nature of the
debate in which we are engaged would be welcome.  If the Supreme Court were to
return us to The Hard Road, the many jurisdictions that would inevitably wish to retain
their existing apparatuses of prison labor would be forced to take the kind of legis-
lative action that would lay bare the extent of their desire to declare that this land of
internal exile, what Foucault called the “carceral archipelago,”73 is a place that is effec-
tively outside of “the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction,” for the
purposes of the Thirteenth Amendment rights of the individuals whom we have ban-
ished to that place.  The only question that remains is whether the potential benefits
of making this discovery will outweigh the individual human costs of the official
actions that would be the source of such revelations.
petitioners purposefully adopted a policy of classifying post-September-11 detainees as ‘of
high interest’ because of their race, religion, or national origin”; instead, “[a]ll it plausibly
suggest[ed] was that the Nation’s top law enforcement officers, in the aftermath of a
devastating terrorist attack, sought to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions
available until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist activity”).
69 See FOUCAULT, supra note 3, at 247 (“All this ‘arbitrariness’ which, in the old penal
system, enabled the judges to modulate the penalty and the princes to ignore it if they so wished,
all this arbitrariness, which the modern codes have withdrawn from the judicial power, has been
gradually reconstituted on the side of the power that administers and supervises punishment.”).
70 Huigens, supra note 27, at 441 & n.11.
71 Id. at 442.
72 GARLAND, supra note 26, at 178–79.
73 FOUCAULT, supra note 3, at 301.
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II. RE-EXAMINING THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT’S IMPLICATIONS FOR PRISON
LABOR
A. The History of Forced Labor as Punishment
In the present day, “well over 600,000, and probably close to a million, inmates
are working full time in jails and prisons throughout the United States.”74  In the fed-
eral system alone, which saw its inmate population increase more than 650% from
1980 to 2005,75 UNICOR, the trade name for Federal Prison Industries, Inc., employs
almost 20,000 of this total,76 and is the thirty-ninth largest federal contractor.77  In
Colorado, the state correctional industries employ “approximately 1,500 inmates at
sixteen DOC facilities located throughout Colorado,” in activities as diverse as “dog
adoption and training,” the production of “high quality office furnishings,” “forms
printing and distribution,” “wild land firefighting and reclamation,” and horse wran-
gling.78  Neither the federal nor Colorado courts sentence criminals to hard labor; in-
stead, the prison systems in both jurisdictions promulgate a general work requirement
for all able-bodied inmates.79
Forced labor is a form of punishment that predates the penitentiary,80 and it
accompanied incarceration as punishment even in its earliest forms.81  In this country,
[i]n the early colonial period, imprisonment was usually an “inter-
mediate step in the punishment process”; the convicted criminal
was temporarily confined while awaiting punishment and, with
the exception of those who suffered capital punishment, he was
released after the penalty had been executed . . . . Among the
punishments inflicted were death, flogging, mutilation, branding,
74 Zatz, supra note 15, at 868.
75 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: FEDERAL PRISON
INDUSTRIES 4–5 (2007) [hereinafter CRS REPORT].
76 Id. at Summary.
77 Posting of Imagine a World in Which Prisoners Have . . . to http://www.dailykos.com/
storyonly/2008/8/4/14245/73239/33/562362 (Aug. 4, 2008, 11:44 PDT).
78 Colorado Correctional Industries: We Build Opportunity 7, 21, available at http://
www.coloradoci.com/bin_htm/aboutUs.html?intro (last visited Nov. 24, 2009).
79 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-24-102(1) (West 2008) (“[T]o the extent possible, all
able-bodied offenders should be employed.”); 28 C.F.R. § 545.20(a)(2) (“Sentenced inmates
who are physically and mentally able to work are required to participate in the work program.”).
80 See ELINOR MYERS MCGINN, AT HARD LABOR: INMATE LABOR AT THE COLORADO
STATE PENITENTIARY, 1871–1940, at 107 (1993) (“Whereas the penitentiary had been chiefly
a product of the nineteenth century, convict labor on roads was certainly not a new concept;
in fact, it had been a traditional role for servi poenas (slaves of punishment or convicts) during
the Roman times, if not before.”) (internal citations omitted).
81 See FOUCAULT, supra note 3, at 121 (“Work was obligatory; it was performed in
common . . . and, for the work done, the prisoners received wages.”).
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stocks, [and] pillory . . . . It was not until the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries that the new states supplemented or re-
placed these forms of punishment with imprisonment and impris-
onment at hard labor.82
For lesser crimes, “[c]onfinement at hard labor in a workhouse or house of correc-
tion for periods of less than a year was a punishment commonly imposed in America
in the colonial period . . . for offences not deemed serious.”83  Forced labor as punish-
ment shared some of the expressive purposes of the pre-penitentiary public punish-
ments.84  In Europe, the “chain-gang, a tradition that went back to the time of the galley
slaves,”85 represented a transitional form of punishment during the period when the
penitentiary replaced the public infliction of pain as the primary penalty for law-
breaking, as “it combined in a single manifestation the two modes of punishment: 
the way to detention unfolded as a ceremonial of torture.”86  The visibly grueling con-
ditions of the roadwork to which the chain gang prisoners in Cool Hand Luke were
subjected87 illustrate additional potential reasons why prolific road-building societies
such as the Roman Empire thought to use conscripted labor for such tasks.88
In their development in the American colonies, “incarceration and inmate labor
became bedfellows for a variety of reasons,”89 including that, “since the inception of
82 United States v. Ramirez, 556 F.2d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 1976) (internal citations omitted);
see also James J. Misrahi, Note, Factories with Fences: An Analysis of the Prison Industry
Enhancement Certification Program in Historical Perspective, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 411, 413
(1996) (noting that the “history of American prisons is also the history of labor in prisons . . . .
Prisons were organized around the concept of work in order to reform the inmate.”).
83 United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 445 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice
Brandeis also stressed that the “labor which inmates were required to perform was not im-
posed as punishment or as a means of disgrace. Nor was the confinement imposed primarily
as punishment.” Id. at 447.
84 See, e.g., id. at 448–49 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating that 1786 Pennsylvania reform
“substituting imprisonment for death, as the penalty for some of the lesser felonies . . . provided
specifically that the imprisonment should be attended by ‘continuous hard labor publicly and
disgracefully imposed.’ Hard labor as thus prescribed and practiced was merely an instrument
of disgrace”).
85 FOUCAULT, supra note 3, at 257.
86 Id.
87 See PEARCE, supra note 2, at 118 (“Our shovel handles were slimy with sweat, our
bodies covered with mud, our lungs choked with the stench of tar and its heat and with the
cloud of dust that billowed away behind us.”). But see BENTHAM, supra note 59, at 166 (“In
public works, the infamy of their publicity tends to render the individuals more depraved than
the habit of working tends to reform them.”).
88 See, e.g., FOUCAULT, supra note 3, at 109 (“Public works meant two things: the collective
interest in the punishment of the condemned man and the visible, verifiable character of the
punishment. Thus the convict pays twice; by the labour he provides and by the signs that he
produces.”).
89 MCGINN, supra note 80, at 53.
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the penitentiary, there has rarely been an occasion on which the degenerative effects
of inmate idleness have not been decried,”90 and both of the schools of American peni-
tentiary reform that arose “during the Jacksonian era . . . had great faith that disciplined
labor was an essential ingredient in building within offenders a moral fiber sufficiently
strong to resist the criminal temptations that prevailed in the larger society.”91  Thirty
years ago, a study of various state prison-labor regimes by the United States Depart-
ment of Justice found that the unanimity on this question remained unchanged:
“Ironically, the view that prisoners ought to work during confinement is supported both
by penologists who advocate that prisons serve a rehabilitative purpose as well as by
those who advocate that prisons serve a punishment and/or deterrence function.”92
Whatever the justification, former North Carolina Governor Jim Hunt expressed
the basic rationale that has always held sway in the United States when he said, “Every
able-bodied prisoner in North Carolina ought to be working and working hard.”93
From the beginning, these reasons have helped inmate labor “persist[] as the
sine qua non of imprisonment” in this country.94  “[B]y 1835 confinement and hard
labor were the most common punishments for all but the relatively few capital crimes
in most states.”95  In 1876, the Supreme Court expressed the common law rule of the
era when it held various federal sentencing statutes to mean that
where the statute requires imprisonment alone, the several provi-
sions which have just been referred to place it within the power
of the court, at its discretion, to order execution of its sentence at
a place where labor is exacted as part of the discipline and treat-
ment of the institution or not, as it pleases.96
One legal observer of the era noted similar trends in the states,97 where separate
sentences of hard labor and incarceration were not held necessary to subject inmates
90 Francis T. Cullen & Lawrence F. Travis III, Work as an Avenue of Prison Reform, 10
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 45, 53 (1984).
91 Id.
92 National Criminal Justice Reference Service, Study of the Economic and Rehabilitative
Aspects of Prison Industry—Prison Industry Statutes 4 (1978), NCJ 046046 [hereinafter
NCJRS Study] (on file with the author).
93 North Carolina Department of Correction, Putting Inmates to Work, http://www.doc
.state.nc.us/work/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2009). In North Carolina, “all able-bodied prison
inmates shall be required to perform diligently all work assignments provided for them,” and
a failure to do so “may result in disciplinary action.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 148-26(a) (2009).
94 MCGINN, supra note 80, at 53.
95 United States v. Ramirez, 556 F.2d 909, 912 n.4 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing BLAKE
MCKELVEY, AMERICAN PRISONS: A STUDY IN AMERICAN SOCIAL HISTORY PRIOR TO 1915,
at 7, 16 (1936)).
96 Ex Parte Karstendick, 93 U.S. 396, 399 (1876).
97 See generally Whitin, supra note 16, at 17–18 (noting that in Tennessee the “sentence
of the court whether expressly provided or not is understood to be a sentence to hard labor,” 
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to both penalties at once,98 although not all states agreed that this was always
appropriate.99
Despite this conflation of the penalties of incarceration and forced labor by
courts and legislators through the nineteenth century, it still remained the case—at
least in the federal system—that “[h]ard labor was a distinct penalty expressly autho-
rized for specific crimes and penitentiary confinement, while not included in the pen-
alty clauses of particular offenses, was ordered by the sentencing judge as part of the
punishment.”100  Since before this time, hard labor punishment without incarceration
was also an available penalty in the United States military,101 and remains one today.102 
However, by the turn of the twentieth century, “hard labor had become primarily a
disciplinary measure used in nearly all institutions regardless of the sentence, instead
of a punishment for specific crimes . . . .”103  In 1909, “[a]s part of its revision and re-
codification of the penal code . . . Congress eliminated hard labor from the punishment
clause of each section,”104 but made sure to note that “[t]he omission of the words
‘hard labor’ from the provisions prescribing the punishment in the various sections
of this Act, shall not be construed as depriving the court of the power to impose hard
labor as a part of the punishment, in any case where such power now exists.”105  It is
only since 1948 that “the [federal] district courts have not been permitted to impose
and in a number of other states, “hard labor, under reasonable restrictions as required in most
prisons, is healthful for mind and body and, in the judgment of prisoners is a veritable boon,
compared with enforced idleness”).
98 See, e.g., Pounders v. State, 74 So. 2d 640 (Ala. Ct. App. 1954) (holding that sentence
to perform hard labor to pay for costs was not improper where court might lawfully have
imposed a sentence to hard labor).
99 See, e.g., Ex Parte Arras, 20 P. 683, 683–84 (Cal. 1889) (voiding judgment that
“impose[d] hard labor as a part of the penalty in case the fine is not paid” on the basis that
only “prisoners convicted of felonies” could be sent to the state prison where such labor took
place, and holding that the “court below had no jurisdiction to impose hard labor as a part of
the punishment” for the non-felonious offense).
100 Ramirez, 556 F.2d at 913; see also DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND WELFARE: A
HISTORY OF PENAL STRATEGIES 7 (1985) (“‘Imprisonment’ is to be distinguished from ‘penal
servitude’ in as much as the former involved sentences of up to two years with or without hard
labour (which, after 1865, was uniformly enforced whether or not the court had explicitly
ordered it) and was served in a local prison. Penal servitude, on the other hand, was to be
served in a convict prison . . . .”).
101 See Major Joseph B. Berger III, Making Little Rocks Out of Big Rocks: Implementing
Sentences to Hard Labor Without Confinement, ARMY LAW., Dec. 2004, at 1, 6 (“Hard labor,
with or without confinement, was established as a permissible punishment in the U.S. Army
nearly 200 years ago.”).
102 Id. at 5 (“Hard labor without confinement is an allowable punishment at a court-
martial . . . .”).
103 Ramirez, 556 F.2d at 915.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 915 (quoting Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 338, 35 Stat. 1088, 1153 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 572 (1940))).
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the punishment of hard labor. . . . [I]t is available to prison administrators as one part
of the ‘individualized system of discipline, care, and treatment’. . . .”106
Similar trends emerged later in the states, such as Colorado, where the inmates in
the first United States penitentiary located there, before statehood, quarried the build-
ing materials for and built the prison.107  In 1972, the state general assembly revised
the criminal code to remove an existing discretionary hard labor sentencing statute,
but retained a general work requirement for state prisoners108 that had existed in some
form for many years.109  Some states, mainly in the Southeast, continue to retain hard-
labor sentencing laws today.  In Alabama, for example, the relevant statute mandates
that “[s]entences for felonies shall be for a definite term of imprisonment, which im-
prisonment includes hard labor.”110  Where such statutes are retained, they are in some
instances quaint in their terms, such as in Nebraska, where the sentence of an indi-
vidual who is sentenced “to imprisonment in the jail of the county as a punishment”
is required to include “that the convict . . . be kept at hard labor in the jail,”111 but as
an alternative to such labor, “the sentence may require the convict to be fed on bread
and water only, the whole or any part of the term of imprisonment.”112
It was also around the beginning of the twentieth century that elements of free
society, most notably a newly-militant labor movement,113 began to agitate against
the further expansion of prison labor, leading to a succession of legislative enactments
meant to curb such growth.114  “As a result of this legislation, the number of prisoners
106 Id. at 917 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4081 (2009)).
107 See Colorado Department of Corrections Facilities: Colorado Territorial Correctional
Facility, available at http://exdoc.state.co.us/secure/comboweb/weblets/index.php/facilities/
view/9 (last visited Nov. 24, 2009); see generally MCGINN, supra note 80, ch. II (describing
siting and construction of Territorial Penitentiary). The prison is still in operation, and is now
called the Colorado Territorial Correctional Facility.
108 Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-10-11 (1883) (“Whenever any person shall be lawfully
sentenced for crime by the judge of any district court in this State, to imprisonment in the State
prison, or to any county jail, it shall be competent for the court awarding such sentence to incor-
porate therein a provision that the person so sentenced shall be kept at hard labor during the
term of such imprisonment, or for any specified portion thereof, as may be adjudged by the said
court.”), with COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-24-102(1) (2008) (“[T]o the extent possible, all able-
bodied offenders should be employed . . . .”).
109 See PRISON INDUS. REORGANIZATION ADMIN., THE PRISON PROBLEM IN COLORADO 29
(1940) (hereinafter PIRA SURVEY) (“The law provides ‘that every able-bodied convict shall
be put to and kept at the work most suitable to his or her capacity. . . .’”).
110 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-6(a) (LexisNexis 2009).
111 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-2208 (LexisNexis 2009).
112 Id.
113 See Dougherty, supra note 21, at 489 (“[I]n the early twentieth century, increasing
pressure from labor unions turned prison labor into a ‘major political issue.’”).
114 See generally id. at 489–90 (discussing events surrounding passage of reforms such
as the Hawes-Cooper Act in 1929 and the Ashurst-Sumners Act in 1935); Zatz, supra note
15, at 869 (“Since roughly the New Deal era, prison industries have been tightly regulated,
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laboring while in prison has greatly decreased from the numbers laboring in the
nineteenth and [early] twentieth centuries.”115
Thus, as the modern correctional regime began to take form, forced labor by
inmates “was not considered an essential element of the penitentiary punishment,”
but it remained widespread nonetheless, in part due to the experiences of some ob-
servers “that it was in fact an alleviation” of the inmates’ conditions.116  Whatever its
salutary benefits, the compelled nature of the work had not vanished, as it remained
the case that “a refusal to work universally [was] treated as a disciplinary infraction.”117 
Furthermore, while “[t]hose who support prisoner labor explain that it contributes to
the discipline of the prison population, combats idleness, allows the prisoner to pay
back the state for the costs of incarceration, and teaches marketable skills that can be
used upon re-entry to the community,”118 the work programs did not always appear
to effectively serve their asserted goals of rehabilitation and education, particularly
where those goals conflicted with the ability of the programs to generate revenue or
be financially self-sustaining.119  As the Department of Justice noted in its own sur-
vey of such programs, “[d]espite the statutory language articulating a rehabilitative
most prominently through the Ashurst-Sumners Act’s criminal prohibition on the sale of
inmate-produced goods in interstate commerce.”).
115 Dougherty, supra note 21, at 491; see also FOUCAULT, supra note 3, at 25 (“[T]he
penitentiary . . ., forced labour and the prison factory appear with the development of the
mercantile economy. But the industrial system requires a free market in labour and, in the
nineteenth century, the role of forced labour in the mechanisms of punishment diminishes
accordingly and ‘corrective’ detention takes its place.”).
116 United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 449 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see
also FOUCAULT, supra note 3, at 269–70 (“Work must be one of the essential elements in the
transformation and progressive socialization of convicts. Penal labour ‘must not be regarded
as the complement and as it were an aggravation of the penalty, but as a mitigation, of which
it is no longer possible to deprive the prisoner.’”).
117 Josephine R. Potuto, The Modern Prison: Let’s Make It a Factory for Change, 18 U.
TOL. L. REV. 51, 54 (1986); see also Mikeska v. Collins, 900 F.2d 833, 837 (5th Cir. 1990),
withdrawn and superseded by 928 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1991) (“All TDCJ inmates, unless
specially classified, are expected to work. The refusal to work, by a group or even a single
inmate, presents a serious threat to the orderly functioning of a prison. Any unjustified refusal
to follow the established work regime is an invitation to sanctions.”).
118 Dougherty, supra note 21, at 485.
119 See Gordon Lafer, The Politics of Prison Labor: A Union Perspective, in PRISON
NATION: THE WAREHOUSING OF AMERICA’S POOR 120, 125 (Tara Herivel & Paul Wright
eds., 2003) (“[P]rison work programs themselves are not operated along job-training lines.
Prisoners are not selected for work based on their need for training, but just the opposite:
employers look for prisoners who already have the skills needed for their jobs. Even those
prisoners who do pick up skills often are being trained in jobs that do not exist, or do not pay
living wages, in the free economy.”); see also FOUCAULT, supra note 3, at 240 (“Moreover,
wages reward the skill of the worker and not the improvement of the convict: ‘The worst sub-
jects are almost everywhere the most skilful workers; they are the most highly remunerated,
consequently the most intemperate and least ready to repent.’”) (internal citations omitted).
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purpose . . . the statutory provisions reviewed indicate that the primary benefit from
the establishment of prison industries is to be derived by the state.”120
There may also exist goals for the prison labor programs that go unsaid.  Foucault
saw forced labor as “one of the essential elements in the transformation and progressive
socialization of convicts,”121 but did not agree that this transformation and socializa-
tion was directed towards reducing recidivism.122  Instead, he argued that the uncon-
scious and unspoken purpose of the penitentiary and hard labor (the latter “necessarily
accompanying” the former),123 was the production of “a politically or economically
less dangerous” form of illegality, one that could be safely divided from law-abiding
society.124  The importance of creating this division overrode the consideration of fac-
tors such as the negative effects such a consolidation of law breakers would have on
those trapped on the other side of the divide,125 and the circumstances of how those
individuals arrived there.  That is, whether they had become incarcerated criminals
through incorrigible social predation, technical violations of laws prohibiting in-
arguably minor forms of misconduct,126 or some middle ground between those two
extremes, was not a relevant consideration, because they were all part of the same
segregated criminal class.127  Under Foucault’s view, then, the distinction between
forced labor as punishment and forced labor as rehabilitation is an irrelevant one.128
120 NCJRS Study, supra note 92, at 6.
121 FOUCAULT, supra note 3, at 269.
122 Id. at 269–70 (“Work must be one of the essential elements in the transformation and
progressive socialization of convicts. Penal labour ‘must not be regarded as the complement
and as it were an aggravation of the penalty, but as a mitigation, of which it is no longer
possible to deprive the prisoner.’”) (citation omitted).
123 Id. at 240 (“Work is neither an addition nor a corrective to the régime of detention:
whether it is a question of forced labour, reclusion or imprisonment, it is conceived, by the
legislator himself, as necessarily accompanying it.”).
124 Id. at 277 (“For the observation that prison fails to eliminate crime, one should perhaps
substitute the hypothesis that prison has succeeded extremely well in producing delinquency,
a specific type, a politically or economically less dangerous—and, on occasion, usable—form
of illegality . . . .”).
125 See Morris E. Lasker, Presumption Against Incarceration, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 407,
412 (1979) (“While incarceration may limit the individual’s contribution to crime in the com-
munity during the period of his imprisonment, numerous studies of prison life indicate that
it in fact generates more crime, and simply confines it within the prison.”).
126 See, e.g., Barbara Ehrenreich, Is It Now a Crime to Be Poor?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9,
2009, at WK9 (describing the incarceration of a homeless man after “the police swept through
the shelter in the middle of the night looking for men with outstanding warrants,” and the indi-
vidual “did indeed have a warrant—for not appearing in court to face a charge of ‘criminal
trespassing’ (for sleeping on a sidewalk in a Washington suburb)”).
127 See, e.g., Mac Donald, supra note 25, at 20–21 (ascribing misconduct by correctional
officers to “corruption” by inmates, who “often share community ties” with officers, and spec-
ulating that two particular officers found to have engaged in misconduct “were undoubtedly
lazy (and probably also part of the same criminal culture to which their charges belonged)”).
128 Cf. GARLAND, supra note 26, at 42 (noting “the puzzling fact that one of the most
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Prison labor, as seen from this perspective, occupies a nebulous space overlapping
two of the “three great schemata” to which Foucault argued “the carceral apparatus
has recourse”; namely, “the economic model of force applied to compulsory work”
and “the technico-medical model of cure and normalization”—what he respectively
called “the workshop” and “the hospital.”129  The blurring of these two distinct ends
illustrates their relative unimportance in our system of punishment.130
After all, even the motivations for the penultimate punitive action that was taken
against Cool Hand Luke—making him repeatedly dig a ditch and then refill it for days
on end—were described by his jailers to him in what would be characterized today as
rehabilitative or administrative terms, i.e., to get his “mind right” and ensure he would
no longer “backslide” into his previous escape-prone behavior.131  This elision high-
lights the misleading nature of these categories.  What really drove us to force our pris-
oners to work from the beginning was “the belief that prisoners were a separate group
deserving only punishment and deprivation; prison labor was perceived as merely a
part of that punishment.  Even when theory evolved so as to characterize prison labor
as rehabilitative, this perspective remained continued.”132  Thus, although “the idea
expressed by the court in Ruffin [v. Commonwealth], that inmates are no more than
‘slaves of the State,’ has been repeatedly and expressly repudiated by other courts,”133
prisoners remain as a class “distinct[] from free labor,” in a way that “inheres not just
in the present organization of their work but also in their persons more deeply.”134
One observer has noted that modern courts faced with work-related claims by
prisoners often seem to “imply that, absent imprisonment, inmate workers would be
single, unemployed, and adrift.”135  Adopting such a perspective on prisoners allowed
frequently used sanctions of the post-war period—the fine—was completely devoid of re-
habilitative pretensions”).
129 FOUCAULT, supra note 3, at 248. The third schemata he described as “the politico-moral
schema of individual isolation and hierarchy,” or “[t]he cell.” Id.
130 Cf. Victor Rabinowitz, The Expansion of Prisoners’ Rights, 16 VILL. L. REV. 1047,
1054 (1971) (“The present prison system . . . is really designed for only two purposes. One
is to punish people . . . [and] the other is to quarantine them . . . . All the talk about reform and
deterrence is nonsense.”).
131 See PEARCE, supra note 2, at 262–65.
132 Leroy D. Clark & Gwendolyn M. Parker, The Labor Law Problems of the Prisoner,
28 RUTGERS L. REV. 840, 841 (1975); see also Zatz, supra note 15, at 885 (discussing an in-
stance where the court declined to find that an inmate was an employee for FLSA purposes,
due to “the essentially penological nature of labor performed by prisoners for a prison.”)
(quoting George v. SC Data Ctr., Inc., 884 F. Supp. 329, 332 (2007)).
133 Washlefske v. Winston, 60 F. Supp. 2d 534, 539 (E.D. Va. 1999), cert. denied, 532 U.S.
983 (2001).
134 Zatz, supra note 15, at 934; see also GARLAND, supra note 100, at 260 (“Today’s penal
complex does not prevent or stop crime in the main—the normal forms of socialisation and
integration do that . . . . Rather, it administers criminals and criminality, managing ‘social
failures’ and not repairing them.”).
135 Zatz, supra note 15, at 934.
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those courts to act on what Foucault called, in a different era, “the principle of non-
idleness.”136  That is, “it was forbidden to waste time, which was counted by God and
paid for by men . . . [it was] a moral offence and economic dishonesty.”137  Within such
an ideological construct, the forced labor of inmates could be simultaneously justified
as being both selfless and punitive, and remain hidden behind penitentiary walls, in “a
context in which it appears to be free of all excess and all violence.”138  In service of
this pretense, courts have willingly abdicated their role in overseeing the boundaries of
inmates’ compelled labor, under any number of different potentially applicable laws.139
B. Forced Labor under the Thirteenth Amendment and Other Laws
“[C]ourts have rarely taken the thirteenth amendment inside the prison gates,”140
preferring instead to “uniformly reject[] claims that the prison-labor system imposes
involuntary servitude in violation of the thirteenth amendment.”141  In one instance,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit relied upon what it viewed as
the “precise and literal wording of the Thirteenth Amendment,” as well as “the un-
wavering line of authority which applies the Thirteenth Amendment precisely as it is
written,” in rejecting a prisoner’s challenge to forced labor without compensation
in the Texas prison system.142  In another, the Seventh Circuit held that forced labor
“imposed as an incident to a conviction of crime” was “punishment for crime excepted
from the prohibition of the Thirteenth Amendment,”143 although the dissenting judge
on the panel pointed out in his portion of the opinion that this holding was not
supported by a plain reading of the amendment.144
Judge Jacques Wiener of the Fifth Circuit once agreed with an inmate-litigant’s
argument “that a prisoner who is not sentenced to hard labor retains his thirteenth
136 FOUCAULT, supra note 3, at 154.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 302.
139 See generally Zatz, supra note 15.
140 Ira P. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 531,
606 (1989).
141 Id.
142 Wendt v. Lynaugh, 841 F.2d 619, 621 (5th Cir. 1988).
143 United States ex rel. Smith v. Dowd, 271 F.2d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 978 (1960); see also Omasta v. Wainwright, 696 F.2d 1304, 1304 (11th Cir. 1983)
(“[W]here prisoner was incarcerated pursuant to presumptively valid judgment . . . and was
forced to work pursuant to prison regulations or state statutes, Thirteenth Amendment’s pro-
hibition against involuntary servitude was not implicated even though the conviction was sub-
sequently reversed.”); Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
915 (1963) (“Where a person is duly tried, convicted, sentenced and imprisoned for crime in
accordance with law, no issue of peonage or involuntary servitude arises.”).
144 Dowd, 271 F.2d at 298 (Parkinson, J., dissenting) (“The exception in the Thirteenth
Amendment does not read punishment incident to crime . . . . It clearly and succinctly states
‘as a punishment for crime’. We have no right to rewrite the Amendment and extend the pro-
visions of the exception to include that which is clearly without its ambit.”).
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amendment rights.”145  His colleague Judge Edith Jones later described this position
as “an anomaly in federal jurisprudence” that, “[t]o the extent [it] conflicts with”
earlier precedents, “lacks authority.”146  Judge Jones instead reaffirmed the doctrinal
authority of the line of cases that expressly disagreed with Judge Wiener’s reading of
the amendment, and “reiterate[d] that inmates sentenced to incarceration cannot state
a viable Thirteenth Amendment claim if the prison system requires them to work.”147
Courts express a consistent hostility to prisoners’ work-related rights claims,
which helps explain their equally consistent rejection of the Hard Road approach that
is argued for in this Article.  This hostility has also been demonstrated by courts’ use
of prisoner workers-rights claims to make attempts to combat violations of inmates’
other constitutional rights more difficult.148  Perhaps the most famous example of
this approach came in response to “the issue of inmate labor unions, a focal point of
prison activism during the 1970s,” when the “[p]rison authorities’ fierce resistance
met Supreme Court approval in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union,
Inc.”149  In the Jones opinion, Justice William Rehnquist reaffirmed that “[p]risons, it
is obvious, differ in numerous respects from free society.”150  The Court overturned
a district court’s grant of equitable relief to inmates challenging regulations forbidding
them from solicitation, meeting, and the distribution of publications in support of a
labor organizing effort on the basis that, inter alia, the lower court’s “requirement of
a demonstrable showing that the Union was in fact harmful [was] inconsistent with the
deference federal courts should pay to the informed discretion of prison officials.”151
In other words, it did not matter that the “appellee’s two expert witnesses, both
correctional officers who had dealt with inmate reform organizations, testified that
such groups actually play a constructive role in their prisons,” or that the “weight of
professional opinion seems to favor recognizing such groups.”152  Such facts were
145 Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1552 (5th Cir. 1990). Judge Wiener’s opinion on this
issue may have been motivated in part by his outrage at the “egregious nature of this misan-
thropic situation in the instant case,” which had served to “disabuse[] [him] of th[e] innocent
misconception” that “in the last decade of the twentieth century scenarios such as the one now
before us no longer occurred in county or parish jails of the rural south except in the imagi-
nations of movie or television script writers.” Id. at 1550.
146 Ali v. Johnson, 259 F.3d 317, 318 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
147 Id. at 317.
148 Another area where this has been done is in the cases involving the due process rights
of pretrial detainees. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979) (holding that “if a par-
ticular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate govern-
mental objective, it does not, without more, amount to ‘punishment’”).
149 Zatz, supra note 15, at 923 (citing Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S.
119 (1977)).
150 Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977).
151 Id. at 136 (citation omitted).
152 Id. at 145 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Paul R. Comeau, Labor Unions for Prison
Inmates: An Analysis of a Recent Proposal for the Organization of Inmate Labor, 21 BUFF.
L. REV. 963, 979 (1971) (“Inmate leadership is present in all prisons . . . . The constructive use
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insufficient to disturb “the full latitude of discretion” that “courts should allow the
prison administrators.”153  Justice Thurgood Marshall protested to no avail that “‘the
realities of running’ a school or a city are also ‘complex and difficult,’ and that those
charged with these tasks . . . also possess special ‘professional expertise,’” but “in no
First Amendment case of which I am aware has the Court deferred to the judgment of
such officials simply because their judgment was ‘rational.’”154
One observer described Jones as “shift[ing] the burden of proof away from the
state by compelling the plaintiff to rebut the officials’ general speculations as to the
union’s possible disruption to orderly administration,” and “emphatically la[ying] the
groundwork for almost absolute judicial deference to many aspects of prison life.”155 
As described below, the courts’ Thirteenth Amendment holdings with respect to pris-
oners are not founded in any historical or original understandings of the amendment
itself, and can only be understood as expressions of this same doctrine of “absolute
judicial deference.”
III. USING TRADITION AND HISTORY AS A TOOL FOR INTERPRETING THE
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. The Ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment
An amendment to the Constitution prohibiting slavery or involuntary servitude
anywhere in the United States or its territories was first introduced in the House of
Representatives and the Senate on December 14, 1863, and January 13, 1864, respe-
ctively.156  “The version of the amendment that ultimately prevailed” was written by
the Senate Judiciary Committee using “language that closely paralleled the slavery
provision in the [Northwest] Ordinance [of 1787],”157 which prohibited slavery “in
areas north of the Ohio River.”158  This prohibition was reputedly drafted in its earliest
of inmate leadership is an obvious way to avoid riots. Some type of inmate self-government that
involves honest and well supervised elections of inmate representatives to discuss problems,
make recommendations and perhaps, even take some responsibilities from the administration
could be helpful.”) (citation omitted).
153 Jones, 433 U.S. at 136.
154 Id. at 141 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice Marshall expressed similar
outrage when the Court a few years later took the same tack in the case of a pretrial detainee
bringing a due process claim. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 568 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(“[B]y blindly deferring to administrative judgments on the rational basis for particular re-
strictions, the Court effectively delegates to detention officials the decision whether pretrial
detainees have been punished.”).
155 Robbins, supra note 31, at 216.
156 Alexander Tsesis, The Thirteenth Amendment’s Revolutionary Aims, in PROMISES OF
LIBERTY (forthcoming) (manuscript at 8 n.70), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1023762.
157 Howe, supra note 49, at 9.
158 Kamal Ghali, No Slavery Except as a Punishment for Crime: The Punishment Clause
and Sexual Slavery, 55 UCLA L. REV. 607, 626 (2008).
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form by Thomas Jefferson.159  One observer has argued that it represented “the first
known use of the punishment clause in federal efforts to abolish slavery, and it became
a template for subsequent efforts.”160
The antislavery language was introduced late in the debates surrounding the ordi-
nance,161 and there is no record of its language being examined in a meaningful way
by a Congress that was depleted by the Constitutional Convention that was also under-
way at that time.162  In any case, the prohibition did not provoke much controversy,
perhaps because it “was not so obnoxious to southern men generally as it might other-
wise be,” as it was included alongside a clause requiring the return of fugitive slaves.163
The narrower language originally proposed in the House of Representatives for
the Thirteenth Amendment “would have allowed only indentured servitude of pris-
oners, but not slavery,”164 but “the drafters of the Thirteenth Amendment spent little
time discussing alternative wordings.”165  There are no records of the debates within
the Senate Judiciary Committee regarding the amendment.166  Instead, “[t]he focus of
the original debate about the thirteenth amendment was not on its punishment clause
but on its central prohibition and its second section on enforcement.”167
Despite the extensive debates over the values and objectives of
the thirteenth amendment, the members of the Reconstruction
Congress directed very little attention to its actual text.  The mem-
bers of Congress rarely considered whether the actual language
of the amendment conveyed the breadth of meanings its advo-
cates ascribed to it.  In the end, the amendment’s text was selected
more for its symbolic significance than for its ability to state the
members’ intention with exactness.168
159 Howe, supra note 49, at 11. But see Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the
Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 450 n.70 (1989) (“Despite the attribution of
this phrase to Jefferson by the Reconstruction Congress, there is some historical evidence that
he did not coin the phrase.”).
160 Ghali, supra note 158, at 626.
161 JAY A. BARRETT, EVOLUTION OF THE ORDINANCE OF 1787, at 77 (1891) (“[T]he propo-
sition did not appear in the report, and not until Congress had fairly finished consideration of
the ordinance, was the part relating to slavery brought forward.”).
162 Id. at 78 (“The Congress of the summer of 1787 was materially affected by the sessions
of the Constitutional Convention. Many of the strong men of North and South were attending
it at Philadelphia, and the Old Congress was left with a somewhat quiet and peaceable company
of men. Its most efficient members were heartily in sympathy with the amendment in question,
and naturally carried much influence with them.”).
163 Id. at 79.
164 Ghali, supra note 158, at 627.
165 Id. at 626.
166 VanderVelde, supra note 159, at 449 n.64.
167 Howe, supra note 49, at 10.
168 VanderVelde, supra note 159, at 448–49. The Supreme Court of that era seemed simi-
larly unperturbed by the existence of any ambiguity in the wording of the amendment. See
2009] A PROMISE THE NATION CANNOT KEEP 421
The Senate passed the amendment without much delay on April 8, 1864, but it
failed in the House on June 15, and ultimately only passed that body in its next session,
“[a]fter much cajoling, vote swapping, and patronage dealing,” as well as the re-election
of Abraham Lincoln, on January 31, 1865.169  “Senators and representatives expressed
a variety of views about the amendment’s scope.  Consequently, they left little in the
way of an authoritative, contemporary perspective beyond the virtually universal belief
among congressmen that the amendment should accomplish much more than the mere
abolition of chattel slavery.”170  Over ten months later, and nearly eight months after
Lee’s surrender at Appomattox, the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified by enough
states to be declared adopted by the Secretary of State on December 18, 1865.171
As one modern observer described it, “the Thirteenth Amendment was not simply
intended by its framers to create a vacuum, but instead to secure a positive end-state.”172 
Toward this end, Section 2 of the amendment “provided the authority to end all man-
ner of subjugation, not only chattel slavery.”173  However, since the time of its rati-
fication, courts have almost uniformly held “that prisoners are ‘explicitly excepted
from’” the amendment’s protections, relying on a definition of “punishment,” as used
in the amendment, that “includ[es] more than the actual prison sentence.”174
As discussed in detail below, this definition is broader than, and bears little re-
semblance to, the ways the word “punishment” is understood and used in the juris-
prudence construing other constitutional rights and protections of prisoners.175  The
ramifications of adopting such a categorical interpretation of the exception imme-
diately became apparent, as the proponents of slavery sought to evade the Thirteenth
Amendment’s positive ban with a startling innovation.
B. Early Understandings of the Thirteenth Amendment
In the early years of Reconstruction, following the Civil War, “the southern states
came to rely heavily on convict-lease systems to handle their prisoners, and those sys-
tems led to a dark history of savagery that matched the worst abuses of slavery.”176 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 69 (1873) (“Its two short sections seem hardly
to admit of construction, so vigorous is their expression and so appropriate to the purpose we
have indicated.”).
169 Howe, supra note 49, at 9.
170 ALEXANDER TSESIS, THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM 38 (2004).
171 Howe, supra note 49, at 10.
172 Lea VanderVelde, The Thirteenth Amendment of Our Aspirations, 38 U. TOL. L. REV.
855, 857 (2007).
173 Tsesis, supra note 156, at 11. But see VanderVelde, supra note 172, at 858 (“Congress
has only utilized its authority under section 2 a mere five times in almost 150 years.”).
174 Ghali, supra note 158, at 621–22 (citations omitted).
175 See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991) (“If the pain inflicted is not formally
meted out as punishment by the statute or the sentencing judge, some mental element must
be attributed to the inflicting officer before it can qualify.”).
176 Howe, supra note 49, at 25.
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In convict leasing, inmates were leased to private parties to engage in compelled labor
for those parties’ economic benefit, a variant on the practice of forced labor as punish-
ment that was not itself new.177  But “the southern leasing systems that arose after 1865
were unprecedented in the number of prisoners involved, in the heavy use of black
prisoners and in the unfettered control given to the leasing parties.”178
In 1867, John Kasson, a Republican Congressman from Iowa, sought to pass legis-
lation clarifying that the intent of Congress with the amendment was not to permit the
convict lease system that had developed in its wake.179  He saw that system as “taking
advantage of the ‘except as a punishment’ language of the Thirteenth Amendment in
order to maintain slavery.”180  His resolution proclaimed that
the true intent and meaning of said amendment prohibits slavery
or involuntary servitude forever in all forms, except in direct exe-
cution of a sentence imposing a definite penalty according to law,
which penalty cannot, without violation of the Constitution, im-
pose any other servitude than that of imprisonment or other re-
straint of freedom under the immediate control of officers of the
law and according to the usual course thereof, to the exclusion
of all unofficial control of the person so held in servitude.181
In the debate surrounding this resolution, Representative Kasson further clarified that
what he intended to communicate by the resolution was that, for forced labor to be
permissible under the Thirteenth Amendment,
there must be a direct condemnation into that condition under the
control of the officers of the law, like the sentence of a man to
hard labor in the State prison in the regular and ordinary course
of law, and that is the only kind of involuntary servitude known
to the Constitution and the law.182
177 See FOUCAULT, supra note 3, at 266–67 (quoting early nineteenth century critic asking,
“[A]re not our prisoners sold, like the slaves, by entrepreneurs and bought by manufacturers . . .
Is this how we teach our prisoners honesty? Are they not still more demoralized by these ex-
amples of abominable exploitation?”); Dougherty, supra note 21, at 488 (“[I]n 1844, during
an economic depression, Louisiana leased its penitentiary for five years to a private company
for $50,000 a year.”); see also Julie A. Nice, Welfare Servitude, 1 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING
POVERTY 340, 360–62 (1994) (discussing interpretive rationale in various court decisions that
“removes most pre-Civil War forms of labor from the reach of the Thirteenth Amendment,”
including conscripted maritime service and roadwork).
178 Howe, supra note 49, at 26 (internal citations omitted).
179 See Ghali, supra note 158, at 627.
180 Id.
181 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 324 (1867).
182 Id. at 345–46.
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The resolution passed the House,183 but was postponed indefinitely by the Senate
Judiciary Committee because it “[thought] the whole subject [was] covered by the
civil rights bill.”184
This somewhat opaque statement of reasons may have meant that the senators
on the Judiciary Committee had repudiated Representative Kasson’s interpretation
of the amendment that they had authored.185  An alternate, narrower reading of the
statement is as a simple reference to Section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which
forbade “any person . . . under color of any law” from subjecting “any inhabitant of
any State or Territory” to “different punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such
person having at any time been held in a condition of slavery or involuntary servi-
tude . . . or by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of
white persons.”186
Some of the statements made at the time of passage of the Civil Rights Act,187 as
well as subsequent interpretations of the amendment or Act that were adopted by the
Supreme Court188 and contemporary observers, are in agreement with this interpreta-
tion of its prohibitions.189  With respect to the punishment exception specifically, not-
withstanding the Judiciary Committee’s statement that “the whole subject” of the
amendment had already been “covered,”190 there was no contrary existing reading
of that exception that had emerged from the original debates surrounding ratification
183 Howe, supra note 49, at 29 n.279.
184 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1866 (1867).
185 See Ghali, supra note 158, at 628–29 (“[T]he fact that the bill was postponed indefi-
nitely in the Senate might be evidence that the drafters of the Thirteenth Amendment explic-
itly rejected Kasson’s view of the punishment clause.”); Howe, supra note 49, at 29 n.279
(“[A]bandonment of the resolution in the Senate raises doubt that the actual authors of the
amendment agreed with the resolution.”).
186 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981–82 (2000)).
187 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 603 (1866) (statement of Sen. Wilson)
(discussing former Confederate states passing laws to maintain freed slaves in slave-like
conditions, referring to an instance “[i]n North Carolina [in which] two men were sold into
slavery for years under the vagrant laws”).
188 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883) (“Severer punishments for crimes
were imposed on the slave than on free persons guilty of the same offences. Congress, as we
have seen, by the Civil Rights Bill of 1866, passed in view of the Thirteenth Amendment,
before the Fourteenth was adopted, undertook to wipe out these burdens and disabilities, the
necessary incidents of slavery, constituting its substance and visible form.”).
189 See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 299 (1868)
(“Nor will the exception permit the convict to be subjected to other servitude than such as
is under the control and direction of the public authorities, in the manner heretofore cus-
tomary . . . . [I]t might well be doubted if a law which should allow the convict to be placed
upon the auction-block and sold to the highest bidder . . . was in harmony with the spirit of
the constitutional prohibition.”).
190 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 1866 (1867).
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of the amendment to which the committee could have been referring.191  The absence
of a definitive historical record on this issue therefore confounds further attempts to
deduce the complete meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment’s exception solely by way
of such sources.192
Furthermore, there had already been resistance at the time of the amendment’s
ratification by some in Congress regarding the nature and scope of the amendment’s
prohibitions,193 despite the fact that “most of the southern states and their represen-
tatives [had] withdraw[n]” as a result of the ongoing Civil War, with the result that
“Congress was composed primarily of representatives of northern states.”194  While
191 See Powell, supra note 54, at 669 (warning that, “on some issues of interpretation the
founders said nothing at all useful”); VanderVelde, supra note 159, at 450 (“Other than elim-
inating chattel slavery, the phrase carried with it no other fixed meaning. Instead, the language
assumed mythical proportions in the Reconstruction debates because it was attributed to
Thomas Jefferson. The members of Congress took solace in the fact that although they were
amending a sacred document, they did so with the language of one of its original architects.”)
(internal citations omitted); see also Howe, supra note 49, at 12 (“Recorded debate over the
punishment clause when the House of Representatives promulgated the thirteenth amendment
was also minimal.”); 34 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1488 (1864) (statement of Sen.
Sumner) (objecting that the words of the punishment exception did “no good there, but they
absolutely introduce[d] a doubt,” since “at the time [of the Northwest Ordinance], for I under-
stand that it was the habit in certain parts of the country to convict persons or to doom them
as slaves for life as punishment for crime, and it was not proposed to prohibit this habit. But
slavery in our day is something distinct, perfectly well known, requiring no words of distinction
outside of itself”). Responses to Sumner’s objection “did not focus specifically on the punish-
ment clause.” Howe, supra note 49, at 13.
192 See, e.g., Powell, supra note 54, at 668 (“What is fundamentally wrong here is that the
interpreter is treating the Constitution itself as an empty shell, a container into which the
founders originally poured meaning that we now can extract by historical investigation. Having
done so, we need pay little attention to the labels on the container. This is fundamentally un-
acceptable, for it effectively denies that we have a written Constitution at all (or locates the
Constitution in the scattered and fragmentary records of its framing and adoption), and opens
the door to the very subjectivity in interpretation that originalists avow a desire to escape.”).
193 See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1490 (1864) (statement of Sen. McDougall)
(“The slaves of ancient time were not the slaves of a different race. The Romans compelled
the Gaul and the Celt, brought them to their own country, and some of them became great
poets, and some eloquent orators, and some accomplished wits, and they became citizens of the
republic of Greece, and of the republic of Rome, and of the empire. This is not the condition
of these persons with whom we are now associated and about whose affairs we undertake
to establish administration. They can never commingle with us.”); id. at 1484 (statement of
Sen. Powell) (“[The negro] is an inferior man in his capacity, and no fanaticism can raise him
to the level of the Caucasian race. The white man is his superior, and will be so whether you
call him a slave or an equal. It has ever been so, and I can see no reason why the history of all
the past should be reversed.”).
194 VanderVelde, supra note 159, at 444; see also Nina Shen Rastogi, Uh . . . Mind if I Sit
Here?: What’s going to happen to the Minnesota and Illinois Senate seats?, SLATE, Jan. 5,
2009, http://www.slate.com/id/2207908 (“The 13th Amendment, for example, which formally
abolished slavery, made its way through Congress during the tail end of the Civil War, when
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abolitionists and proponents saw the proposed Thirteenth Amendment as a positive
ban on all forms of slavery and involuntary servitude,195 its opponents expressed
concern that the amendment was an improper and overreaching exercise of the
power to amend the Constitution, particularly at a time when the Civil War was still
being fought.196  Among the Republicans, there was a faction that “urged that the
amendment strictly be limited to enslaved blacks, and . . . adamantly resisted any
broader interpretation . . . .”197
The Senate Judiciary Committee may simply have lacked the political will or
desire, two years later, to re-engage in these difficult debates, even though the seats
of the former Confederate states in both the House and the Senate remained unoc-
cupied.198  The silence of the Thirteenth Amendment’s authors on the scope of the
punishment exception in this instance199 may foretell a similar reluctance on the part
of modern legislatures to engage in the difficult debates called for by this Article.  But
their silence is also a blessing, as it relieves us of the burden of “obedience to history,”
and forces us to “use some process of generalization or analogy to go beyond what
history can say.”200
both the Senate and the House were refusing to seat members from rebel states. That meant
there were 52 active senators, with 20 vacant Southern seats, when the amendment passed
in January 1865. (The final vote was 38-6.)”).
195 See TSESIS, supra note 170, at 103 (Pennsylvania Congressman M. Russell Thayer won-
dered: “What kind of freedom is that which is given by the amendment of the Constitution,
and if it is confined simply to the exemption of the freedom from sale and barter? Do you give
freedom to a man when you allow him to be deprived of those great natural rights to which
every man is entitled by nature?”).
196 See 35 CONG. GLOBE 38th Cong,. 2nd Sess. 528 (1865) (statement of Rep. Kalbfleisch)
(“In my opinion the amendment you now propose to provide for may stand in the way of both
peace and Union. Even while this measure is under discussion messengers are passing between
Washington and Richmond, and if these men are successful, and if the negotiations they pro-
pose to inaugurate result in anything, the very question we now propose to commit ourselves
upon will form the chief obstacle in the way of a settlement of our difficulties.”); CONG.
GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1483 (1864) (statement of Sen. Powell) (“I do not believe it was
ever designed by the founders of our Government that the Constitution of the United States
should be so amended as to destroy property.”).
197 VanderVelde, supra note 159, at 445; see also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1784 (1866) (statement of Sen. Cowan) (“The true meaning and intent of that amendment
was simply to abolish negro slavery. That was the whole of it. . . . What more did it do?
Nothing . . . .”).
198 Howe, supra note 49, at 29 n.279.
199 Id.
200 Powell, supra note 54, at 665 (“But once it is conceded that the Constitution speaks to
questions that those who adopted it did not answer, it becomes obvious that in such cases the
interpreter must use some process of generalization or analogy to go beyond what history can
say. The inevitable disputes over whether a given interpretation over-generalizes or is based on
a faulty analogy are not resolvable by historical means; at this point history, and originalism
as a program of obedience to history, have no more to add to constitutional discourse.”).
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History has, after all, already had its role in restricting the core power of the
Thirteenth Amendment to ban slavery or involuntary servitude anywhere in the United
States or its jurisdiction.  The abolitionists who advocated a broader reading of the
amendment comprised the faction that is “generally recognized as having carried the
day,”201 but the dissenters’ narrow reading of the Thirteenth Amendment ultimately
succeeded in defining the scope of the amendment’s application for decades to come,
after the Supreme Court’s 1883 decision in the Civil Rights Cases.202  In that decision,
the Court read Section 2 of the amendment to only “clothe[] Congress with power to
pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery
in the United States . . . .”203  In the eyes of many modern observers, the Court thereby
restricted all future federal legislation passed under Section 2 to that which “only
end[ed] practices directly related to institutional slavery, including impediments to
black court testimony and property ownership,”204 and “reduced the amendment to its
least common denominator:  the abolition of mid-nineteenth century southern racial
chattel slavery.”205
The Supreme Court had first held, in 1872, that, “[u]ndoubtedly while negro
slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress which proposed the thirteenth article,
it forbids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter,” and, therefore, “if other rights
are assailed by the States which properly and necessarily fall within the protection
of these articles, that protection will apply, though the party interested may not be of
African descent.”206  After its opinion in the Civil Rights Cases, though, and for the
remainder of the nineteenth century and beyond, the Court continued to “read the
Thirteenth Amendment as a narrow rule against slavery-like forms of involuntary ser-
vitude.”207  It was not until the early twentieth century that the Court would explicitly
uphold a statute on the basis that the Thirteenth Amendment’s protections extended
farther than this,208 and it was not until the modern civil rights era that the Court would
201 VanderVelde, supra note 159, at 445.
202 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
203 Id. at 20.
204 Alexander Tsesis, A Civil Rights Approach: Achieving Revolutionary Abolitionism
Through the Thirteenth Amendment, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1773, 1826 (2006) (citing  Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 22).
205 VanderVelde, supra note 159, at 503.
206 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1873).
207 Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil Rights, 50
DUKE L.J. 1609, 1638 (2001).
208 Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241–42 (1911) (upholding 1867 anti-peonage statute
enacted under Section 2 authority as “a valid exercise of this express authority,” because
“Congress was not concerned with mere names or manner of description, or with a particular
place or section of the country. It was concerned with a fact, wherever it might exist; with a
condition, however named and wherever it might be established, maintained or enforced.”);
see also United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 143, 150 (1914). One observer sees these
“peonage” cases as the “exception” to the otherwise nearly-uniform view of the courts that
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begin to affirmatively apply the amendment’s protections on that basis,209 thereby
“recalling the Civil War Rights Statutes into service after a century’s desuetude.”210
As discussed above, one constant that remained throughout this time period was
that the federal courts continued to reject any application of the amendment’s protec-
tions within prison walls, a view that remains consistently held, with some scattered
exceptions in dicta,211 through the present day.  This stands in striking contrast to how
those same courts have construed the meaning of “punishment,” where it has arisen
in the context of other amendments to the Constitution.
IV. USING DOCTRINE AND PRECEDENT AS A TOOL FOR INTERPRETING THE
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. The Meaning of Punishment in the Eighth Amendment
The language of the Eighth Amendment212 was, like the Thirteenth Amendment,
taken from an earlier provision in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.213  These “amend-
ments are the only two provisions of the Constitution that purport to regulate the treat-
ment of prisoners,”214 and the only instances where the word “punishment” appears
in the amendments, although it also appears twice in the Constitution itself.215
“the thirteenth amendment [is not] protective of the convicted prisoner.” Howe, supra note
49, at 34 n.330.
209 See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); see also Goluboff, supra note
207, at 1675 (“The South had in many respects operated as a separate labor market into the
middle of the twentieth century . . . . Maintaining the impermeability of the southern labor
market, however, was precisely the goal of many state and local enticement, emigrant agent,
hitchhiking, and vagrancy laws.”).
210 Bhandari v. First Nat’l Bank of Commerce, 829 F.2d 1343, 1345 (5th Cir. 1987).
211 See, e.g., Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549, 1552 (5th Cir. 1990) (“We agree that a
prisoner who is not sentenced to hard labor retains his thirteenth amendment rights; however, in
order to prove a violation of the thirteenth amendment the prisoner must show he was subjected
to involuntary servitude or slavery.”). But see Ali v. Johnson, 259 F.3d 317, 318 (5th Cir. 2001)
(“Watson’s statement about involuntary servitude is an anomaly in federal jurisprudence.”).
212 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The amendment reads in full: “Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”
213 Gorman, supra note 56, at 462; see also BARRETT, supra note 161, at 61, 86–87 (relevant
text of ordinance reads, “[A]ll fines shall be moderate, and no cruel or unusual punishments
shall be inflicted”).
214 Ghali, supra note 158, at 611.
215 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To provide for the
Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States . . . [and]
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against
the Law of Nations . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (“The Congress shall have Power to declare
the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or
Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.”).
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The Eighth Amendment prohibits the “inflict[ion]” of “cruel and unusual punish-
ments.”216  Through the nineteenth century, it was generally understood that “the prohi-
bition extended only to such punishment as amounted to torture, involved unnecessary
cruelty, or shocked the conscience of the community.”217  At the beginning of the
twentieth century, however, the Supreme Court recognized that state courts had con-
sidered that, based on a “precept of justice that punishment for crime should be grad-
uated and proportioned to offense,” certain punishments “might be so disproportionate
to the offense as to constitute a cruel and unusual punishment.”218  A half-century later,
the Court went further and proclaimed that the “basic concept underlying the Eighth
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.”219  Because “the words of the
Amendment are not precise,” and “their scope is not static,” for courts to properly apply
its protections, “[t]he Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”220
Until 1991, “it was assumed, if not established, that the conditions of confinement
are themselves part of the punishment, even if not specifically ‘meted out’ by a statute
or judge.”221  It was during this era that the Court first held, in Estelle v. Gamble,222
“that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘un-
necessary and wanton infliction of pain’ . . . proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”223 
As one observer saw it, “[s]ince Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court has adhered to
the view that punishment means more than one’s actual sentence.”224  However, in
1991, in Wilson v. Seiter,225 a majority opinion authored by Justice Scalia sharply
proscribed the circumstances under which the Court would so expand the meaning
of punishment.226
216 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Supreme Court has held that this prohibition applies
through the Fourteenth Amendment to set substantive limits on the sentences states may
impose. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (“We hold that a state law which
imprisons a person thus afflicted as a criminal, even though he has never touched any narcotic
drug within the State or been guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
217 Commentary, Constitutional Law—Eighth Amendment—Cumulative Impact of Deplorable
Conditions of Confinement in State Prison Constitutes Cruel and Unusual Punishment, Even
Though Inmates Were Subjected Incidentally Rather Than in Deliberate Retribution for Criminal
Conduct, 23 ALA. L. REV. 143, 145 n.16 (1970) [hereinafter Alabama Commentary].
218 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367–68 (1910) (citation and quotations omitted).
219 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
220 Id. at 100–01.
221 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 856 (1994) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
222 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
223 Id. at 104 (citation omitted).
224 Ghali, supra note 158, at 634 (citing Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106, which held that prisoners
must prove “deliberate indifference” to their medical needs).
225 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
226 Id.
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In Wilson, the Court distinguished between harms that it characterized as prison
conditions and those that are “formally meted out as punishment by the statute or
the sentencing judge,” with the former category of harms only being actionable where
“some mental element . . . attributed to the inflicting officer” is present.227  Stated
differently, “Eighth Amendment claims based on official conduct that does not purport
to be the penalty formally imposed for a crime require inquiry into state of mind.”228 
The animating concern for Justice Scalia in promulgating this rule was that prison
officials should be immune from constitutional tort damages where the proximate
cause of harm was not something that “has been deliberately administered for a penal
or disciplinary purpose.”229
The infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise
or deter.  This is what the word means today; it is what it meant
in the eighteenth century. . . . [I]f [a] guard accidentally stepped
on [a] prisoner’s toe and broke it, this would not be punishment in
anything remotely like the accepted meaning of the word, whether
we consult the usage of 1791, or 1868, or 1985.230
In dissenting from subsequent Court majorities, Justice Clarence Thomas charac-
teristically expressed this concern in more sweeping terms: “The Eighth Amendment
is not, and should not be turned into, a National Code of Prison Regulation.”231  As
he saw it, the Court had “made clear in Estelle that the Eighth Amendment plays a
very limited role in regulating prison administration.”232  He also believed that “the
185 years of uniform precedent”233 prior to Estelle, “consistent with [the amendment’s]
text and history,”234 provided strong “support [for] the view that judges or juries—but
not jailers—impose ‘punishment,’”235 and that “[t]hat is also the primary definition
of the word today.”236  Accordingly, the operative principle to which the federal courts
adhere today in construing the amendment is that “[t]he Eighth Amendment does not
outlaw cruel and unusual ‘conditions’; it outlaws cruel and unusual ‘punishments’. . . .
[A]n official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but
did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned
as the infliction of punishment.”237
227 Id. at 300 (emphasis in original).
228 Id. at 302.
229 Id. at 300 (citation and quotations omitted).
230 Id. (citing Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 816 (1986)).
231 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 28 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
232 Id. at 20.
233 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 40 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
234 Id. at 39.
235 Id. at 40.
236 Id. at 38.
237 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837–38 (1994).
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Admittedly, there are textual differences in the usages of the word “punishment”
in the Eighth and Thirteenth Amendments, respectively.  For one thing, the Eighth
Amendment uses a verb to ban a particular action (no “cruel and unusual punishments
[shall be] inflicted”),238 while the Thirteenth Amendment bans the existence of slavery
or involuntary servitude, except as punishment (“Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime . . . shall exist . . . .”).239  For another, the
word is singular in the Thirteenth Amendment but plural in the Eighth, although this
distinction seems irrelevant for interpretative purposes.240
The importance of the word “inflicted” in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence can
be seen in the second of the two requirements that must be met to find that a prison
official has violated the amendment:  the “prison official must have a ‘sufficiently
culpable state of mind.’”241  This requirement “follows from the principle that ‘only
the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment.’”242 
What the presence of the verb does, then, is provide for an additional category of
wrongful conduct, i.e., situations where “the pain inflicted is not formally meted out
as punishment by the statute or the sentencing judge, [but] some mental element [can
still] be attributed to the inflicting officer.”243  The baseline understanding of the
meaning of “punishment” as something that is “formally meted out” as such “by the
statute or the sentencing judge,”244 is not itself modified.
Finally, the fact that the Eighth Amendment employs an active voice, and the
Thirteenth a passive one, should not affect the meaning of “punishment” as used
respectively in these amendments.  It would be a slender reed indeed to rely on such
a latter-day grammatical distinction to differentiate the substantive nature of these
amendments’ protections, where no other meaningful basis for doing so exists.245
238 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
239 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; see Ghali, supra note 158, at 633–34 (“The Eighth Amend-
ment’s use of punishment is part of a prohibition. It forbids certain kinds of punishments—
cruel and unusual ones. The Thirteenth Amendment’s use of punishment is part of an exception
to the amendment . . . . [T]he punishment clause limits the amendment’s reach.”).
240 See Ghali, supra note 158, at 633 (“It is true that the Eighth Amendment’s usage of
punishment is plural, whereas the Thirteenth Amendment’s usage is singular. But that is hardly
a distinction that makes a difference. Both uses of punishment appear to contemplate some
kind of a penalty.”).
241 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991)).
242 Id.; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (“The infliction of such
unnecessary suffering is inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency . . . .”).
243 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991); see also Alabama Commentary, supra note
217, at 149 (“Had these conditions of confinement been imposed as part of the punishment
for breach of prison rules, or had juries required them as part of the punishment for criminal
acts, their constitutionality would indubitably be an eighth amendment question.”).
244 Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300.
245 See, e.g., Powell, supra note 54, at 673–74 (“[T]he founders’ purposes, intentions, and
concerns—indeed, the whole of their discussions of matters of high politics—took place in
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B. The Meaning of Punishment under the Fifth Amendment
Although the word “punishment” does not appear in the Fifth Amendment, the
meaning of the word has always played an important role in judicial understandings
of the amendment’s protections.  “The distinction between disciplinary and administra-
tive judgments pervade[d] the case law”246 under the Due Process clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments247 until 1995, when the Supreme Court in Sandin v.
Conner248 rejected an inmate’s argument “that any state action taken for a punitive
reason encroaches upon a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.”249  As the
majority saw it in Sandin, the “punishment of incarcerated prisoners . . . effectuates
prison management and prisoner rehabilitative goals.”250  The Court accordingly held
that the dispositive issue for due process purposes was whether the action taken sub-
jected the inmate in question to “the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which
a State might conceivably create a liberty interest.”251  This remains the governing
rule today.252
While the Court has moved its due process jurisprudence away from the focus
on punitive intent that animates so much of its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, an
older strand of case law construing another portion of the Fifth Amendment squarely
addresses the meaning of punishment under the Constitution, and has not been modi-
fied or overruled.  These cases concern the scope of the protections contained in the
Fifth Amendment’s first clause, which states that “[n]o person shall be held to answer
for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of
a Grand Jury.”253
a thought-world, and were conducted in a political language, distinct from our own . . . . The
founders, in short, must be translated before they can contribute to our conversation.”).
246 Wallace v. Robinson, 940 F.2d 243, 253 (7th Cir. 1991) (Cudahy, C.J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 961 (1992).
247 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons
born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
248 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
249 Id. at 485.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 486.
252 See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 222–23 (2005).
253 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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In 1885, the Supreme Court observed that, “[f]or more than a century, imprison-
ment at hard labor in the state prison or penitentiary or other similar institution has
been considered an infamous punishment in England and America,” for purposes of
the protections of the Indictment Clause of the Fifth Amendment, because it fell into
the class of punishments “that consist principally in their ignominy.”254  On this basis,
a decade later the Court held, in Wong Wing v. United States,255 that the “imprisonment
at hard labor” of three Chinese immigrants “before [their] sentence of deportation
[was] to be carried into effect” was a clear violation of these protections.256  As the
Court saw it, if Congress sought to “subject[] the persons of such aliens to infamous
punishment at hard labor” in furtherance of immigration policy, “such legislation, to
be valid, must provide for a judicial trial to establish the guilt of the accused.”257
A later generation of the Court confirmed that the punishment that was infamous
for these purposes was the labor by itself, not the incarceration.  “In other words, it
was declared that if imprisonment was in any other place than a penitentiary and was
to be at hard labor, the latter gave it character, that is, made it infamous and brought it
within the prohibition of the Constitution.”258  Because of this prohibition, “Congress
could not legally invest the Commissioner with power to make hard labor an adjunct
of the imprisonment,” since this was “beyond the power of legislation to direct with-
out making provision ‘for a judicial trial to establish the guilt of the accused.’”259
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as described previously,
American prison systems moved from imposing forced labor as punishment in indi-
vidual cases to mandating it generally for administrative purposes.  In the federal
system, these reforms meant that “the two noncapital infamous punishments lost
their character as punishments imposed by a sentencing court and became part of the
disciplinary regimen and rehabilitative program established by the Attorney General
and the newly created Bureau of Prisons.”260
Under the rule of the Indictment Clause cases exemplified by Wong Wing, the dis-
cretion that shifted to the Executive allowed the Attorney General to “establish a
disciplinary regimen or take punitive action because of the needs of the institution,”
but not to “punish individual prisoners for their crimes.”261  The “punitive element
connected with the crime,” namely “the loss of freedom for some period of time,”
remained “the only element still controlled by the sentencing judge.”262  Therefore,
254 Ex Parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 428 (1885) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *377) (quotations omitted).
255 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
256 Id. at 235–36.
257 Id. at 237.
258 United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 437 (1922).
259 Id. at 440 (citation omitted).
260 United States v. Ramirez, 556 F.2d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 1977).
261 Id. at 920.
262 Id. at 921.
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the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that “[w]ithin
this system punishments can be distinguished, for the purpose of applying the indict-
ment clause, only in terms of the length of time during which a prisoner is deprived
of his freedom.”263
Under this view, as in the Eighth Amendment decisions previously discussed,
“punishment for crime” is, by definition,264 only that which is explicitly handed down
by the judiciary as such.  This is also the generally accepted meaning of the concept
of “punishment.”265  The judges in these cases drew upon this broadly-held societal
norm to hold that prison officials lack the ability in themselves to “punish individual
prisoners for their crimes.”266  This means that the distinction between forced labor
for rehabilitative purposes and for punishment is a meaningful one,267 and mandates
that the only involuntary servitude of prisoners that would not be prohibited by the
Thirteenth Amendment is that to which they are sentenced by a judge or jury.
What distinguishes the cases construing the Fifth Amendment’s Indictment Clause
from the Eighth Amendment cases is that the Eighth Amendment cases dealt primar-
ily with the question of official intent in the absence of a sentence, while the Fifth
Amendment cases addressed the substance of the sentence in question.  Civil chal-
lenges to sentences268 are a type of claim to which the doctrine of prison deference
263 Id. The court then held “that a criminal defendant who is subject to confinement for
more than one year must be prosecuted by an indictment.” Id.
264 The formulation is somewhat redundant by its terms, and dates back in usage at least
as far as the Roman Empire. See Punishment, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/punishment/ [hereinafter STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA]
(referencing “the classic norms of Roman law, nulla poena sine leges and nulla poena sine
crimen (no punishments outside the law, no punishments except for a crime)”).
265 See id. (“Harms of various sorts may befall a wrong-doer, but they do not count as
punishment except in an extended sense unless they are inflicted by personal agency,” since
“not all socially authorized deprivations count as punishments; the only deprivations inflicted
on a person that count are those imposed in consequence of a finding of criminal guilt . . . .”).
266 Ramirez, 556 F.2d at 920.
267 Cf. STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 264 (“What marks out nonpunitive deprivations
from the punitive ones is that they do not express social condemnation.”). But see id. (“[N]o
single explicit purpose or aim is built by definition into the practice of punishment. The practice,
as Nietzsche was the first to notice, is consistent with several functions or purposes . . . .”).
268 See Adams v. United States, 372 F.3d 132, 134–35 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Title 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2241 and 2255 each create mechanisms for a federal prisoner to challenge his detention,
but the two sections offer relief for different kinds of perceived wrongs. Section 2255 provides
relief in cases where the sentence: (1) was imposed in violation of the U.S. Constitution or the
laws of the United States; or (2) was entered by a court without jurisdiction to impose the
sentence; or (3) exceeded the maximum detention authorized by law; or (4) is otherwise subject
to collateral attack. We have held that § 2255 is the appropriate vehicle for a federal prisoner
to challenge the imposition of his sentence . . . . Section 2241 by contrast is the proper means
to challenge the execution of a sentence. In a § 2241 petition a prisoner may seek relief from
such things as, for example, the administration of his parole, computation of his sentence by
parole officials, disciplinary actions taken against him, the type of detention, and prison con-
ditions in the facility where he is incarcerated.”) (citations omitted).
434 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 18:395
properly has no application, as sentencing has always been one of the judiciary’s
essential functions.269  This may be the reason why courts have felt more inclined to
parse the meaning of “punishment” in these two contexts—so as to establish bound-
aries of authority between the separate branches270—than they have been in construing
the protections of the Thirteenth Amendment.
This does not mean that prisoner-claimants have encountered increased success
in litigation based on the courts’ usage of this definition of punishment.  There are
no significant published Indictment Clause decisions of more recent vintage than the
1970s, other than those pertaining to immigration detainees,271 but those cases have
not led to the greater effectuation of detainees’ rights in this context.272  Nor are inmate
civil challenges to their sentences generally an area of greater success than so-called
“conditions of confinement” cases.273  Notwithstanding the notion that no “iron
curtain [exists] between the Constitution and the prisons,”274 this rate of failure is
illustrative of the modern approach to our generally despised incarcerated class.275
269 Cf. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (disagreeing “that the Judicial Branch
must defer to Executive and Legislative Branch decisionmaking,” where “the issue [they]
address[ed] is whether aliens that the Government finds itself unable to remove are to be
condemned to an indefinite term of imprisonment within the United States”), superseded by
8 C.F.R. § 241.14 (2001).
270 Cf. United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 441 (1922) (“When an accused is in danger
of an infamous punishment if convicted, he has a right to insist that he be not put upon trial
except on the accusation of a grand jury.”) (citations omitted).
271 See, e.g., Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1387, 1390 (10th Cir.
1981) (citing Wong Wing in support of holding that “an excluded alien in physical custody
within the United States may not be ‘punished’ without being accorded the substantive and pro-
cedural due process guarantees of the Fifth Amendment,” and, therefore the alien’s “continued
incarceration [for no reason] other than the fact that no country has agreed to take him [was]
insufficient reason to hold him further”).
272 See, e.g., Carrera-Valdez v. Perryman, 211 F.3d 1046, 1048 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The only
arguably contrary decision [to the majority rule that “an excludable alien may be detained
indefinitely when his country of origin will not accept his return”], Rodriguez-Fernandez v.
Wilkinson . . . has not garnered adherents and is of doubtful vitality in its own circuit.”)
(citations omitted). Similarly, in the earliest stages of the War on Terror, there was little con-
cern with such individuals’ rights as a general rule. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF
ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE
SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS (2003), http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/index.htm (detailing
abuses of force and process committed against individuals detained on immigration charges
following terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001).
273 See, e.g., JOHN SCALIA, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL APPEALS, 1999 WITH
TRENDS 1985–99, at 5 (2001) (noting that, “during 1995, 65% of habeas and § 2255 motions
were dismissed”).
274 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974).
275 See FOUCAULT, supra note 3, at 287 (“At the dawn of the twentieth century . . .
surrounded by contempt, the highest of walls, the prison finally closed in on an unpopular
2009] A PROMISE THE NATION CANNOT KEEP 435
If the return to The Hard Road that is argued for in this Article similarly does not
lead to meaningful differences in the application of the Thirteenth Amendment’s pro-
tections to prisoners, it will be for reasons that go beyond the meager winning per-
centage of prisoner constitutional claims in the court system—reasons that link to the
roots of the penitentiary system and the role forced labor plays in it.
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF PROPERLY APPLYING THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT IN
PRISON
A. The Difference Between Forced Labor as Punishment and “Hard Labor”
As this Article has explored, the notion that criminals should be forced to work
as part of their punishment is a long-standing pillar of collective morality with an
ancient foundation.276  We teach our children that, to the extent such labor is useful
and publicly humiliating, it serves its purpose.277  The infliction of pain as an incident
to, or necessary component of,278 such labor has a separate identity and distinct value.279 
The additional notion that such work can be beneficial to the administration of the
prison280 or the welfare of the inmate, to the degree that it actually provides useful
education or training,281 is of a more recent vintage, but still as old as penitentiary
confinement in Western Europe and the New World.282
people.”) (quoting MICHÈLE PERROT, DÉLINQUANCE ET SYSTÈME PÉNITENTIAIRE DE FRANCE
AU XIX SIÈCLE (1975) (unpublished)).
276 See discussion supra Part II.A.
277 See, e.g., CARS (Walt Disney Pictures 2006) (Lightning McQueen is made to repave the
main road in town that he has destroyed using “Bessie,” an old paving machine, as punishment.).
278 See BENTHAM, supra note 59, at 153 (“It is manifest, therefore, that when a punishment
of the laborious kind is appointed, another punishment must necessarily be appointed along
with it. There are, therefore, in every such case, two different punishments at least necessarily
concerned.”).
279 Cf. PEARCE, supra note 2, at 262–65 (Cool Hand Luke is made to repeatedly dig and fill
in a hole, and is also beaten. When he ultimately pretends to submit, he only asks not to be
beaten, without mention of the task.).
280 See Misrahi, supra note 82, at 413–14 (arguing that the open-population “Auburn” prison
model that is the norm today won out over the competing “Walnut Street” total-segregation
model in the early 1800s, because a “system of complete isolation . . . places great constraints
on the ability to introduce industrial techniques into the prison setting because labor is neces-
sarily limited to handicraft of an artisan nature”); see also Dougherty, supra note 21, at 486–87
(“[T]he Walnut Street Jail had difficulty sustaining itself economically,” while “[t]he Auburn
Penitentiary was economically self-sufficient and made a profit for the government by pro-
ducing goods such as footwear, clothing, carpets, barrels, harnesses, and furniture.”).
281 See PIRA SURVEY, supra note 109, at 1 (listing, as one “basic concept[] of a modern
State penal system,” the provision of “[u]seful work for every prisoner, both to preserve and
develop his own capacity for work and through his labor to reduce the cost to the taxpayers
of keeping him in prison”).
282 See FOUCAULT, supra note 3, at 242 (“The prison is not a workshop; it is, it must be
of itself, a machine whose convict-workers are both the cogs and the products; it ‘occupies
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This rehabilitative concept never intruded very far into the public consciousness,
in the same way that the rehabilitative model of corrections as a whole failed to do
so.283  Thus, it seems entirely possible that any public examination of the current prison
labor regime in the United States would result in a public demand for more grueling
prison work programs.284  What would be interesting to know would be whether the
phrase “working hard,” as used by former Governor Hunt,285 means something dif-
ferent in the context of prisoners than it does in the free world.
Webster’s Dictionary defines “hard labor” as “[c]ompulsory physical labor as-
signed to criminals as part of a prison term.”286  Black’s Law Dictionary defines it
more precisely as “[w]ork imposed on prisoners as additional punishment, usu[ally]
for misconduct while in prison,”287 and notes that it can be imposed as a sentence in
“[s]everal states” and “in military sentencing.”288  Neither definition explicitly contem-
plates forced labor programs for rehabilitative, administrative, or educational purposes,
reflecting the absence of such non-punitive considerations in the traditional under-
standing of labor as punishment,289 however much of a role those considerations
played in the development of such programs in this country.290
The term “hard labor” presumably embodies a set of properties that can be
contrasted with a different set of properties embodying a separate condition, that of
“non-hard,” but nonetheless forced, labor.291  The latter condition is also presumably
them continually, with the sole aim of filling their moments.’ . . . If, in the final analysis, the
work of the prison has an economic effect, it is by producing individuals mechanized according
to the general norms of an industrial society . . . .”).
283 See GARLAND, supra note 26, at 10 (arguing that the “penal-welfare framework” repre-
sented “the aspirational values of political elites rather than the sensibilities of the general
public,” and that these values “no longer set the emotional tone for public discourse about crime
and punishment”).
284 See id. at 9 (“Punishment—in the sense of expressive punishment, conveying public
sentiment—is once again a respectable, openly embraced, penal purpose . . . .”).
285 See Cullen & Travis, supra note 90.
286 WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 564 (1986).
287 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 721 (7th ed. 1999).
288 Id. But see Berger, supra note 101, at 1 n.5 (noting that “[c]urrent military dictionaries
do not define hard labor”) (citations omitted).
289 See, e.g., MCGINN, supra note 80, at 7 (“When man disobeyed and was driven from the
Garden of Eden for his sins, his punishment mandated that ‘in the sweat of thy face shalt thou
eat bread.’ From the beginning omniscient wisdom chose labor as the first means to restore
fallen man.”) (internal citation omitted).
290 See ORLANDO FAULKLAND LEWIS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN PRISONS AND
PRISON CUSTOMS, 1776–1845, at 10 (1922) (“When William Penn . . . founded the province
of Pennsylvania, he brought from the British monarch permission to establish a penal code of
most exceptional mildness, which . . . allowed the substitution of imprisonment at hard labor
for former bloody punishments . . . . In a tour of Holland, he had inspected the Dutch work-
houses, which . . . were well-developed institutions for the amendment of lawbreakers through
compulsory labor.”).
291 See Berger, supra note 101, at 3 (“What was legally permissible [as of 1886], however,
was arduous, physical labor that, although it may have caused some physical suffering or pain,
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less harsh from the perspective of the inmate,292 to a degree that would ideally cor-
relate to whatever “the punishment’s intended punitive impact”293 is meant to be. 
This is consistent with the originating purpose of punishment by forced labor as, in
part, an act of public shaming,294 which has both a deterrent goal295 and a symbolic,
“expressive” one.296
But how much more harsh should forced labor be than what non-incarcerated
working people endure?  The question can be answered by looking at two of the peno-
logical justifications that are used for the labor.297  Most criminologists “devolve into
two broad camps: the retributive and the consequentialist.”298  As Campos explained,
[t]he retributive view is founded on the idea of desert—we punish
the criminal because the blameworthiness he has incurred through
his actions makes it morally fitting (perhaps imperative) that we
do so.  The consequentialist position is essentially utilitarian:
Punishment is justifiable to the extent that the good results that
was commensurate with the full demands of justice.”). The Army Major who made these obser-
vations offered examples of hard labor that he believed would be constitutionally permissible
today, including “strictly punitive tasks such as repetitively filling and emptying sandbags,”
and “hav[ing] the Soldier dig fighting positions . . . for the sole punitive purpose of having
the Soldier fill them back in.” Id. at 12.
292 See id. at 5 (“Since the establishment of the [Uniform Code of Military Justice], at least
one court has recognized that when executed, the ‘labor required of present-day prisoners
[sentenced to hard labor] is often no more strenuous than the cutting of grass or leaf raking.’”)
(quoting United States v. Bruce, 17 M.J. 1083, 1085 (A.F.C.M.R. 1984)).
293 Id. at 7.
294 See FOUCAULT, supra note 3, at 109 (“Public works meant two things: the collective
interest in the punishment of the condemned man and the visible, verifiable character of the
punishment. Thus the convict pays twice; by the labour he provides and by the signs that he
produces.”).
295 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 101, at 8 (“The performance of meaningful hard labor in
post stockades would have the distinctively desirable effect of making the prisoner remember
his time spent in the stockade and instilling in him a strong desire never to return.”) (citation
omitted).
296 See, e.g., Pugsley, supra note 45, at 401 (describing “what Professor Feinberg has
termed ‘the expressive function of punishment’” as requiring, inter alia, that “condemnation
is expressed by hard treatment, and the degree of harshness of the latter expresses the degree
of reprobation of the former,” such that “[p]ain should match guilt only insofar as its in-
fliction is the symbolic vehicle of public condemnation”) (citing JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND
DESERVING 98, 117 (1970)).
297 But see Huigens, supra note 27, at 439 (describing as “[o]ne of three pervasive con-
fusions in commonplace punishment theory” the “conflat[ion of] two different things: the ends
of punishment and theories of punishment”).
298 Campos, supra note 29, at 1931; see also Alice Ristroph, Respect and Resistance in
Punishment Theory, 97 CAL. L. REV. 601, 603 (2009) (describing “the two main camps in
punishment theory, retributivism and consequentialism”).
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flow from it (primarily deterring future violations of the law)
outweigh the evil consequences that result from inflicting pain on
the individuals who are punished.299
The two “camps” represent abstractions of the opposite ends of the penological theory
spectrum, and correctional policies will usually employ some mix of both in their
purposes and justifications.300
Either the retributive or consequentialist views of punishment can be employed
to provide a floor, a minimum amount of “hardness” that will qualify forced labor as
punishment.301  Under retributive principles, to the extent such labor is forced upon
the convict for that convict’s own betterment, it may be ignominious but it does not,
philosophically at least, constitute punishment for crime.302  Consequentialist principles
impose a comparable demand that the labor be sufficiently “hard” to deter individuals
from committing prohibited acts.303
The ceiling on the severity of such punishments can similarly be located in either
school of thought.304  The retributive limitation on the power to punish is contained
in the modern understanding of the meaning of the adjectives “cruel and unusual” in
the Eighth Amendment.305  As previously discussed, when the Supreme Court first
pronounced the Eighth Amendment’s protections in the twentieth century, it focused
on whether certain punishments “‘might be so disproportionate to the offense as to
constitute a cruel and unusual punishment.’”306  This is the essence of retributivism,
299 Campos, supra note 29, at 1931.
300 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Commentary, Criminal Justice in the Information Age:
A Punishment Theory Paradox, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 683, 685 (2004) (“Desert commonly
has more influence than crime control in assigning criminal liability, but the two share control
of sentencing.”).
301 See, e.g., Russell L. Christopher, Time and Punishment, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 269, 290–91
(2005) (stating that consequentialism, or “deterrence concerns,” can set the “floor” with respect
to an appropriate amount or degree of punishment).
302 Cf. GARLAND, supra note 26, at 36 (“In contrast to the judicial power to punish, which
had long been subject to scrutiny and review, the powers of social workers and psychologists
were regarded in a more benign, apolitical light . . . . Their mission was viewed as an up-
lifting, civilizing one that tried to distance itself and its objectives from the penal mechanisms
in which it operated.”).
303 See Christopher, supra note 301, at 282 (citing R.A. Duff, Penal Communications:
Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punishment, 20 CRIME & JUST. 1, 5–6 (1996)) (stating that
“consequentialism conceives punishment as a means to an end”).
304 Cf. id. at 290–91 (citing H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 8–11 (1968)) (stating that “retributivist considerations” can determine
the “ceiling” on the “amount or degree of punishment”).
305 But see Howe, supra note 49, at 40 (arguing that “[t]he thirteenth amendment clause
is more easily understood as bounding future growth in the application of the eighth amendment
language rather than yielding to it”).
306 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910) (quoting McDonald v. Commonwealth,
53 N.E. 874, 875 (Mass. 1899)).
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which “demands a reciprocity of suffering.”307  Consequentialist principles, for their
part, foreclose the use of particular punishments where their utility is deemed to
have sufficiently diminished in comparison to the harms they visit.308
The question that naturally follows the setting of these upper and lower limits
is whether the meaning of “punishment for crime,” as understood in the Thirteenth
Amendment, takes up the entirety of the space between these limits.309  One could
reasonably observe that the practice of forced labor as punishment actually extends
further in many instances today, downwards into the category of “non-hard” forced
labor,310 which is understandable given the primarily consequentialist justifications
that are used for modern prison labor programs.311  The courts are not correct that such
labor can rightfully be called punishment, for the purposes of escaping the Thirteenth
Amendment’s prohibitions, simply by virtue of it occurring in prison.
B. The Potential of the Thirteenth Amendment in the Alternate Universe of The
Hard Road
If Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence had followed the historical arc that con-
stitutional due process jurisprudence has described, it too would have arrived at the
question of substance as the crucial one, as the case law recently did in that line of
cases.  This Article argues that the protections of the Thirteenth Amendment should
rightfully have been applied by courts using the same distinction between disciplinary
and rehabilitative/administrative actions which historically animated the due process
cases,312 until the test changed in 1995 in Sandin v. Conner.313  In such a world, Judge
Wiener’s view that convicted prisoners still retain some Thirteenth Amendment rights
would have been the governing rule, rather than an outlier statement.  With the aban-
donment of the punitive/administrative distinction in the due process context post-
Sandin, this alternate-universe Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence would likely
307 Campos, supra note 29, at 1936.
308 See Huigens, supra note 27, at 442 (“The imposition of a draconian penalty can upset
the proper balance between society, the victim, and the offender just as surely as the crime
itself has done.”).
309 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
310 See Lafer, supra note 119, at 121 (listing examples of modern prisoner labor, such as
“telemarketing,” “pack[ing] and ship[ping] thousands of copies of Windows software,” and
“clean[ing] the stock shelves” at local stores).
311 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 148-26(a) (West 2009) (“Work assignments and
employment shall be for the public benefit to reduce the cost of maintaining the inmate popu-
lation while enabling inmates to acquire or retain skills and work habits needed to secure honest
employment after their release.”).
312 See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983) (holding that no due process right
was implicated in “the transfer of an inmate to less amenable and more restrictive quarters
for nonpunitive reasons,” because “administrative segregation is the sort of confinement that
inmates should reasonably anticipate receiving at some point in their incarceration”).
313 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
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also have seen a shift towards looking at the nature of the inmate’s deprivation as the
dispositive issue.  Any such substantive inquiry would follow, as the due process
cases ostensibly follow, “the principle of minimalism (less is better), that is, given any
two punishments not ruled out . . . and roughly equal in retributive and preventive
effects for a given offense and class of offenders, the less severe punishment is to be
preferred to the more severe.”314
Indeed, the existing Thirteenth Amendment cases of this universe look at that very
issue of substance, in instances where the individuals whose constitutional rights are
claimed to have been violated are not incarcerated.315  In the governing case in this
area, United States v. Kozminski,316 the defendants were criminally prosecuted for
keeping “two mentally retarded men” as unpaid laborers on their farm, “in poor
health, in squalid conditions, and in relative isolation from the rest of society.”317  In
addition to holding the men in these conditions, the government also argued that the
Kozminskis used those same conditions “to cause the victims to believe they had no
alternative but to work on the farm.”318  The Supreme Court took this opportunity to
define involuntary servitude for the purposes of criminal liability under the Thirteenth
Amendment as “a condition of servitude in which the victim is forced to work for the
defendant by the use or threat of physical restraint or physical injury, or by the use or
threat of coercion through law or the legal process.”319  Congress subsequently ex-
panded this definition to include coercion through threats of “psychological, financial,
or reputational harm.”320
Any existing non-voluntary prison labor program, whether supported by an ad-
ministrative requirement or a sentence, would likely qualify under the Kozminski test
314 STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 264.
315 The exceptions to this rule came in the early twentieth century, when the Supreme Court
held the labor being compelled to have been known to the common law prior to the ratifi-
cation of the amendment. See Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 331–33 (1916) (denying Thirteenth
Amendment challenge to road work conscription, since “[f]rom Colonial days to the present
time conscripted labor has been much relied on for the construction and maintenance of roads,”
and the amendment “introduced no novel doctrine with respect of services always treated as
exceptional, and certainly was not intended to interdict enforcement of those duties which
individuals owe to the state, such as services in the army, militia, on the jury, etc.”); see also
The Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918) (“Finally, as we are unable to con-
ceive upon what theory the exaction by government from the citizen of the performance of his
supreme and noble duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation
as the result of a war declared by the great representative body of the people, can be said to
be the imposition of involuntary servitude in violation of the prohibitions of the Thirteenth
Amendment, we are constrained to the conclusion that the contention to that effect is refuted
by its mere statement.”).
316 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
317 Id. at 934.
318 Id. at 936.
319 Id. at 952.
320 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2) (2006).
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as at least a form of legal coercion, as the Court itself acknowledged in that opinion:
“The express exception of involuntary servitude imposed as a punishment for crime
provides some guidance.  The fact that the drafters felt it necessary to exclude this
situation indicates that they thought involuntary servitude includes at least situations
in which the victim is compelled to work by law.”321
It does not matter for these purposes whether an individual claiming to be held in
involuntary servitude was paid for this work,322 but that detail would probably matter
to the average citizen, as would the type of work that was being required of inmates. 
Garland has noted how “the fact that the language and affect of punitiveness disap-
peared from official discourse while remaining strongly present in popular culture
and common sense would re-emerge as an important source of tension in the 1980s
and 1990s.”323
Similarly, whatever the actual rationales for these programs, members of the
public might not consider the following examples of modern prison labor programs
(compulsory or otherwise) as “hard labor” in any sense: in the federal system,“fleet
management and vehicular components,” “recycling activities,” and “services (which
includes data entry and encoding)”;324 in Washington state, manufacturing “aircraft
components”;325 or in California, staffing an airline “reservations service” call center.326 
The existence of these strikingly pedestrian categories of labor is not a recent inno-
vation.  In Colorado, as early as 1939, inmates were employed not only in making
license plates, but also “knit goods,” soap, and mattresses, and in farming.327
Accordingly, forcing legislatures to amend their criminal statutes to bring their
jurisdictions’ general work requirements into compliance with the Thirteenth Amend-
ment bears the heavy risk of making the overall prison labor situation worse from the
prisoners’ perspectives.328  Garland has warned that the “highly charged political
321 Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 942.
322 See Kathleen A. McKee, Modern-Day Slavery: Framing Effective Solutions for an Age-
Old Problem, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 141, 160 (2005) (“[I]n order to prevail in a suit alleging
a violation of Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment, a plaintiff will have to prove that he
was ‘compelled by force, coercion, or imprisonment and against his will to labor for another
whether or not he is paid.’”) (citation omitted).
323 GARLAND, supra note 26, at 41.
324 CRS REPORT, supra note 75, at 3.
325 Paul Wright, Making Slave Labor Fly: Boeing Goes to Prison, in PRISON NATION ,
supra note 119, at 114.
326 Lafer, supra note 119, at 121.
327 See PIRA SURVEY, supra note 109, at 31–34.
328 See, e.g., Leonard Orland, From Vengeance to Vengeance: Sentencing Reform and the
Demise of Rehabilitation, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 29, 37 (1978) (“Is there not a substantial risk
that available rehabilitative programs will diminish or disappear? Would not that danger be
even greater to jurisdictions which adopt the Model Sentencing and Corrections Act of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which guarantees inmates
a statutory right not to be rehabilitated, a right not to participate in treatment programs?”).
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discourse [that] now surrounds all crime control issues” means that “every decision
is taken in the glare of publicity and political contention and every mistake becomes
a scandal.”329  This often results in pointlessly expressive enactments, such as the
proposal introduced by Nevada Senator John Ensign in 2008 to require a 50-hour
workweek for federal prison inmates.330  Such is the nature of what is “very much
a political process,” to be “governed not by any criminological logic, but instead by
the conflicting interests of political actors and by the exigencies, political calculations
and short-term interests that provide their motivations.”331
However, as this Article has argued, we have throughout our history forced con-
victed criminals to work as punishment for their crimes, and continue to, although
we have not always clearly understood our motivations for doing so.  A return to The
Hard Road would at least clarify that our purpose in compelling this labor is punitive,
and that awareness may by itself constrain our actions in ways that we are not con-
strained when we believe (or we are told) that we are acting in the prisoner’s own
best interest.332
CONCLUSION:  THE HARD ROAD AS ONE THAT IS POTENTIALLY LESS TRAVELED
The political forces described above could simply prevent any action whatsoever
on these issues, which is different from saying that the number of hard labor programs
in the country will not increase.333  There is, after all, another long-standing meaning
of the word “punishment” that is consistent with the courts’ Thirteenth Amendment
holdings, if not their Fifth or Eighth Amendment ones, and courts could stand firm on
this meaning as the appropriate one in this instance.  Broadly stated, this is the view
that “punishment is the imposition upon a person who is believed to be at fault of
something commonly believed to be a deprivation where that deprivation is justified
by the person’s guilty behavior.”334  There is no language of intent or invocation of
sentencing here, only the notion that “punishment is an objectively judged loss or
burden imposed on a convicted offender.”335  The Supreme Court has similarly con-
flated the circumstantial and purposeful imposition of prison conditions in its due
process jurisprudence.336  This conflation ignores the distinction between non-punitive
329 GARLAND, supra note 26, at 13.
330 Prisoner Opportunity, Work, and Education Requirement (POWER) Act, S. 3695, 110th
Cong. (2008).
331 GARLAND, supra note 26, at 191.
332 See Pugsley, supra note 45, at 391–97.
333 See, e.g., Riederer, supra note 21, at 1453 (noting that, in recent years, “most states
have instituted some form of labor program, and a growing number of states have included hard
labor as a component of their programs. Furthermore, some states are experimenting with new
models of prison labor programs, drawing on historical models”).
334 Morris, supra note 45, at 482–83.
335 STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 264.
336 See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995) (“[P]unishment of incarcerated prisoners”
has as one of its aims to “effectuate[] prison management and prisoner rehabilitative goals.”).
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practices such as rehabilitation, which has a forward-looking purpose—to change
future conduct—with punishment, which is necessarily backwards-looking and pre-
mised on conduct that has already occurred.337  It also obscures the potential for even
punitively-motivated forced-labor programs to be less “hard” than one might initially
imagine, but still serve retributive purposes.338
In the same way that the different goals of prison labor are invoked in overlapping
ways that reveal their unimportance,339 so too are the circumstances of such labor’s
imposition glossed over in revealing fashion.340  The ultimate value being served is
simply the “belie[f], in theory at least, that prisoners should work—and work hard.”341 
The tenacity of this belief can be seen in the doctrinally puzzling argument of the
Army Major who argued that hard labor, with or without imprisonment, remains a
constitutionally permissible sentence under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.342 
The Major also argued that, as the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces (CAAF) is “confined to ‘the review of specified sentences imposed by courts-
martial,’”343 the CAAF has no authority to rule on the “nature of the hard labor” to
which a soldier is assigned, as that “is a commander’s decision, not a judicial one . . .
and not a finding or sentence over which the court can exercise jurisdiction.”344
The jailer in such a world does indeed possess the power to punish, which, lacking
punitive intent or “deliberate indifference,”345 the Supreme Court has emphatically
proclaimed he does not possess under the Eighth Amendment.  Perhaps a court in-
tending to make this rule explicit will at least proffer a reason why there are two dif-
ferent meanings, in two different amendments, of the same word, both times to the
detriment of the rights of prisoners under the Constitution.  Courts presented with
337 See Ernest van den Haag, Punitive Sentences, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 123, 130 (1978)
(“Punishment, then, need not rest on anything but past threats; and it cannot rest on the desire
for rehabilitation or incapacitation both of which refer only to future conduct. . . . [H]owever
useful punishment is in rehabilitating or incapacitating, neither is logically related to punish-
ment’s essential function: to deter from crime.”).
338 See, e.g., Riederer, supra note 21, at 1469–81 (setting forth model statutes for proposed
punitive hard-labor program).
339 Cf. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (“[T]he Constitution ‘does not mandate
adoption of any one penological theory’ . . . [and a] sentence can have a variety of justifi-
cations.”) (citation omitted).
340 But see Wallace v. Robinson, 940 F.2d 243, 252 (7th Cir. 1991) (Cudahy, C.J., dissent-
ing) (“[T]he inquiry into intent should not be abandoned simply because a majority of this court
may believe that it is not cost-effective. The line that Illinois draws between disciplinary and
administrative reasons for official action reflects a deeply-rooted belief in the importance of
intent in this context . . . . As Justice Holmes once observed, ‘even a dog distinguishes between
being stumbled over and being kicked.’”) (citation omitted).
341 Berger, supra note 101, at 2.
342 See generally id.
343 Id. at 16 (citing Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529 (1999)).
344 Id.
345 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
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such a seemingly inexplicable difference between the two amendments, from the
standpoint of the inmates affected,346 could also reasonably conclude, as courts in
the area of administrative law have, that such a broad grant of power to correctional
officials should at least be tempered by the requirement that there exist intelligible
bases for the different actions they undertake with such power.347
Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark once remarked that “[t]here are few
better measures of the concern a society has for its individual members and its own
well being than the way it handles criminals.”348  The return of The Hard Road that is
called for in this Article would provide an opportunity for us to once again measure
the extent of an individual’s rights that we wish to withdraw upon his or her convic-
tion for crime.  This is a question of ongoing and vital importance to those already
incarcerated, but its importance to those of us who remain free is comparably high,
and not as attenuated as we might imagine at first blush.
346 Cf. Wilkerson v. Stalder, No. 00-304-C, 2007 WL 2693852, at *18 (M.D. La. Sep. 11,
2007) (“If an official’s actions are taken with no legitimate penological basis, it does not
matter whether the claimed violation is under the Eighth Amendment or the Fourteenth
Amendment or both amendments, as is the case here . . . . Changing amendments does not
turn improper motivation into proper motivation.”).
347 See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
685–86 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (describing nondelegation doctrine as requiring
“that, to the extent Congress finds it necessary to delegate authority, it provides the recipient of
that authority with an ‘intelligible principle’ to guide the exercise of the delegated discretion”)
(citations omitted).
348 Alabama Commentary, supra note 217, at 153 n.50.
